Conclusion
The Impact of City-State Cultures on World History

MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN

The Concept of City-State

The purpose of this study has been to clarify the concept of city-state and to describe the essential characteristics by which city-states differ from other types of state. To assess the results of our investigations we must compare the descriptions of the concepts of city-state and city-state culture presented in the introduction pp. 16-9 with previous descriptions of what a city-state is, and in this context it seems important to distinguish between three different approaches. One is to study one individual city-state culture and to use the term city-state synonymously with the term for state used by the people in question, e.g. Greek *polis*, or Latin *civitas*, or Nahuah *altepetl*, or Yoruba *Ilu*, etc. The second is to construct a model of the city-state by focusing on one specific city-state culture, e.g. the Sumerian, whose characteristics are then extrapolated and applied to other city-state cultures. The third approach is from the outset to study a number of city-state cultures and then to construct a model on the basis of all the city-state cultures which have been examined.

The first approach needs no further comment in this context,[1] and the two other approaches are not necessarily opposed. In fact, the third can be seen as a further development of the second. One starts by studying one city-state culture and then looks for others with similar characteristics. The inclusion of further examples leads to a revision and generalisation of the initial model, which again may lead to inclusion of further examples, etc. etc. If the idiosyncratic characteristics of the original model are carefully eliminated in the process, the result is a general model, an ideal type which is never identical with any of the examples under examination. This method is, in short, a typical instance of what Gadamer calls a *hermeneutic circle* ([1972] 275-83 *et alibi*).

(A) The three city-state cultures which are commonly used as the basis for constructing a general concept of city-state are the Sumerian, the Hellenic and the Italian. It suffices here to list one prominent example of each.

(1) In *The Emergence of Civilization* (1990) Charles Maisels distinguishes between two types of state: the city-state and the village-state. Long sections of the book are devoted to the city-state and, apart from a very short passage about the Greek city-states (11-12, 307-9) it is the Sumerian city-states of the 4th and 3rd millennium B.C. which serve as the point of departure for the model (131-98, 269-74, 310-12).

(2) Colin Renfrew and John Cherry selected the Greek *poleis* as their example of how city-state cultures can illustrate their principle of peer polity interaction (Renfrew & Cherry [1986] 10-15, cf. 47-58).

(3) Peter Burke wrote the chapter on city-states in J.A. Hall (ed.), *States in History* (1986), and he chose the Medieval and Renaissance Italian *città* as the point of departure for his description of what a typical city-state is (140-3).

(B) There are fewer examples of the comparative approach and the following list of four studies, though not exhaustive, represents, I think, the milestones.

(1) The first representative of this approach is, not unexpectedly, Arnold J. Toynbee. In *Cities on the Move* (1970) the second chapter is devoted to city-states, and here (44) Toynbee claims that "A city-state may be defined as a state in which there is only a single city or in which a single city is so superior in terms of population and power to any minor cities that may be included in its territory that this one city's paramountcy in the state is indisputable."[2] The city-state cultures on which this minimum definition is based are the Mesopotamian, Phoenician, Philistine, Greek, Roman, Northern Italian, Southern French and Northern German (The Hanseatic League). There is no mention of city-state cultures outside Europe and the Near East.

(2) While Toynbee devoted just one chapter to the city-state a much more ambitious comparative study was attempted by R. Griffeth and C. Thomas, *The*

City-State in Five Cultures (1981). The five cultures studied are the Sumerian, Greek, Italian, Swiss & German, and Hausa. Griffeth and Thomas are fully aware of the fact that these five cultures are just a sample and that many others might have been included (185, 202). What constitutes a city-state is, in their opinion, a usually walled city with a hinterland (in order to ensure economic self-sufficiency). In a city-state there is a fundamental sense of shared language, culture and history with other units like it in the same region; the smallness of scale is emphasised, and, finally, independence is regarded as the most important aspect of the city-state (Griffeth & Thomas [1981] xiii-xx, 181-207).

(3) In a short, but influential account published in 1993 Bruce Trigger, like Charles Maisels, distinguishes between two basic types of state: "city-state systems" and "territorial states". A city-state system is defined as a network of adjacent city-states and a city-state is a state centred on a capital city which possesses a territory of a few hundred square kilometres and a population of from less than 1,000 to over 100,000 inhabitants. Considerable numbers of farmers lived in the city behind the walls, but the city was also a centre of craft production, craft specialization and commercial exchange. Warfare between city-states occurred all the time, but when city-states conquered their neighbours, they normally compelled them to pay tribute but left their political institutions intact, preferring to rule indirectly. The four city-state systems on which this model is based are the Sumerian, the Aztec, the Maya and the Yoruba (Trigger [1993] 8-14).[3]

(4) The fourth major comparative study of the concept of city-state is Deborah Nichols and Thomas Charlton (eds.), *The Archaeology of City-States. Cross Cultural Approaches* (1997). It is both broader and narrower than the other three studies. It is broader, in my opinion too broad, by including a higher number of city-state cultures, i.e. those of Mesopotamia, Egypt (dynasty 0), the Indus culture (Harappan phase), China (during the Shang and Zhou dynasties), Greece, Okinawa, the Maya, Central Mexico from ca. 1700 B.C. to ca. 1600 A.D., and Peru.[4] It is narrower by focusing on city-state cultures which are principally (but far from exclusively) known from their archaeological remains. The definition of city-state advanced by Charlton and Nichols runs as follows: "In general we understand city-states to be small, territorially based, politically independent state systems, characterized by a capital city or town, with an economically and socially integrated adjacent hinterland.

The whole unit, city plus hinterlands, is relatively self-sufficient economically and perceived as being ethnically distinct from other similar city-state systems. City-states frequently, but not inevitably, occur in groups of fairly evenly spaced units of approximately equivalent size."

The present study is based on the research programme of the Copenhagen Polis Centre[5] and carried out under its auspices. The main objectives of the investigation have been:

(a) To distinguish the concept of city-state from the concept of city-state culture, thereby relegating isolated city-states from our investigation and stressing the interaction between city-states as an indispensable characteristic.

(b) To offer a polythetic description of both concepts, thereby replacing definitions of the concepts with what can reasonably be called Weberian ideal types.

(c) To take the criterion of small size seriously and, accordingly, to exclude early states such as Teotihuacan in Mexico and Harappa in the Indus valley. In both cases we have an urbanised macro-state with a territory of over 100,000 km^2, not a micro-state consisting of a city with its immediate hinterland.[6]

(d) To reject independence (usually equated with autonomy) and economic self-sufficiency as essential characteristics of the concept of city-state. Instead, we want to introduce the concept of the dependent city-state alongside the concept of the independent city-state, and to emphasise trade between city and country, between city-states in a city-state culture, and between a city-state culture and neighbouring civilisations as essential factors. Thus, in our model of the city-state, economic interaction has replaced autarky as one of the basic characteristics.

(e) To present a more comprehensive study by including thirty city-state cultures, plus a few other civilisations which have some features in common with a city-state culture but too few to deserve inclusion.[7]

Criticism of the Concept of City-State

So far it has been taken for granted that the concept of city-state is universally accepted and that all problems concern how to optimise its intension and delimit its extension. We must now address the issue that there are some sholars who are hostile to the concept of city-state and want to get rid of both the notion and the term. Their criticism can conveniently be subsumed under two headings: (a) it is believed that the term city-state was coined to describe the ancient

Greek *polis* and that, therefore, the concept of city-state is too narrowly linked to the concept of *polis* to be of any value outside the classical Greek world. (b) The other objection is that urban civilisations split up into many small states are so different from one another that any attempt to generalise and construe a city-state concept which covers them all must result in a dilution of the concept. Characteristics truly shared by all such civilisations are so few and commonplace that the concept becomes meaningless.

I believe that both objections can be countered; and the best way of doing it is, I think, to quote and discuss the most recent attack on the term and the concept, *viz.* Joyce Marcus and Gary Fineman's introduction to *Archaic States* (1998): a "term many participants would like to see phased out is 'city-state'. This term came into widespread use as a kind of English synonym for the Greek polis (Burke 1986; Griffeth and Thomas 1981; Jones 1981). There are two problems with its use: (1) many Aegaean specialists do not believe that the polis was a state at all, and (2) many of the polities all over the world to which the term has been applied do not resemble the Greek polis. The polis has been defined as a democratic and self-sufficient polity in which the majority of towns and villages had a high decree of autonomy and very little economic control over their citizens (Snodgrass). Almost no society to which this term has been applied in Mesoamerica (for example) fits this definition. Many of the seminar participants (and indeed many of our colleagues elsewhere) would gladly scrap the term. As Peter Burke (1986: 151) writes, 'the choice is between giving the concept up or resigning oneself to using it imprecisely'" (8-9).

I strongly oppose this attempt to eliminate the concept of city-state, and I have the following comments.

(a) City-state and Polis – Two Different Concepts

(1) The English term city-state is a translation of the German term *Stadtstaat* which was invented to describe the early Roman *res publica* or *civitas*, not the Greek *polis*.[8] Admittedly, it was soon transferred to Greek history, but not exclusively. The association with the Roman concept of *civitas* was retained (Fowler [1893]; Cornell [1995]), and the concept of city-state (*Stadtstaat*) was soon applied to the medieval Italian cities (Pflugk-Harttung [1889] 398; von Below [1898] 16 *et alibi*) and some of the ancient Near Eastern communities (Weber [1921/1972] 739 *et alibi*). The parallel between the early Roman *civitas*

and the Mzâb cities in northern Sahara was pointed out already by Masqueray in (1886) 221-58.

(2) It is true that some historians of ancient Greece dissociate the concept of *polis* from the concept of state.[9] They adopt the view advocated by many political scientists that state is a modern notion, and that it is nonsense to speak about "states" in descriptions of ancient societies.[10] Consequently, these historians, if asked, are prone to be as hostile to Marcus' and Fineman's notion of "archaic states" as they are to the idea that the *polis* is a state. It must be noted, however, that their distinction between *polis* and state is based on the simplistic view that the ancient *polis* was identical with the body politic whereas the modern state is, first of all, identical with its government. Such a view does not take into account that the body politic is an important aspect of the modern state,[11] and that government was an important aspect of the ancient *polis* (Hansen [1998] 64-7). It is worth noting that classicists with a professional background in sociology have had no qualms about applying the concept of state in their description of the *polis*. One example is Moses Finley (1983) 8-9. His problem was rather whether the *polis* could be truly described as an urbanised society, i.e. as a "city".[12] Another example is Fustel de Coulanges ([1864] 280-6), who claimed that the Greek *polis* and the Roman *civitas* were indeed states, but states pervading all aspects of human life; what the Greeks and Romans did not have was a concept of individual freedom in a civil society, distinguished from the state.

(3) It is true that a high degree of autonomy – usually equated with independence – is commonly associated with the concept of *polis*,[13] but in actual fact it fits, e.g., the Italian *città* much better than the Greek *polis*: a *città* which lost its independence lost its identity as a state (*supra* 277, 289). But independence was not a *sine qua non* for being a *polis*. Many *poleis* were in fact dependencies of various kinds and are correctly described in our sources as being *poleis hypekooi*, i.e. dependent *poleis* (*supra* 170). Furthermore, if, for the sake of argument, we accept autonomy as an essential aspect of the *polis*, no opposition between *polis* and state can be established in this respect, since autonomy = independence is commonly singled out as a characteristic of the state (*infra* 606-7).

(4) It is a mistake to hold that the *polis* has been defined as a democratic polity. In all accounts of the *polis*, from Aristotle and to the present day, it has been acknowledged that some *poleis* were democracies, some were oligarchies and some were monarchies (*supra* 165-6). The specific form of constitution was not an essential aspect of the *polis* as such.

(5) It is true that the *polis* is often defined as an (economically) self-sufficient polity.[14] This view can be traced back to Aristotle's *Politics*, but the interpretation of Aristotelian autarky as essentially *economic* self-sufficiency is a modern misrepresentation of what Aristotle actually says.[15]

To conclude, it is misguided to discard the concept of city-state on the grounds that it is just the concept of *polis* in disguise and, accordingly, cannot be used to describe the political units found in other civilisations. Moreover, although ancient Greek history has traditionally played a prominent part in the debate over what a city-state is, the concept has spread in this century to descriptions of, first, ancient Near-Eastern and medieval European communities, and in connection with this process it has been transformed and stripped of the aspects specifically connected with the concept of *polis*. I would say that in comparative studies which use one civilisation as the point of departure the Italian *città* ranks as high or perhaps even higher than the Greek *polis*. In studies by archaeologists, the *polis* is central. In studies by historians the Italian city-states seem to prevail. Second, during the last fifty years the concept of city-state has been applied with increasing frequency to Asian, African and Mesoamerican civilisations (see *infra* 604 with notes 32-4). Once again we sometimes meet, in a wider context, the objection that a concept developed to describe one civilisation is erroneously transferred to descriptions of civilisations of a totally different character. This time the objection is not just that the concept of city-state is the concept of the ancient Greek *polis* in disguise. Here the point is rather that it is a concept invented by European and North American historians and thus reflects a "western" interpretation of the civilisations of other continents. This line of argument has been adduced by, for example, some Nigerian and Chinese historians. The Nigerian historians want to emphasise the Islamic aspects of African civilisation. The Chinese prefer a Marxist interpretation of early China as a feudal society.[16] The relevant chapters of this volume show, I think, that the hostility towards the concept of city-state has been a drawback which unnecessarily has obstructed comparative studies of the present type.

(b) The Alleged Imprecision of the Concept of City-State

The other objection is more serious and can only be countered by some general reflections on what a concept is. In history – as well as in all other fields of research – all concepts and all classifications are by necessity artificial grids pressed down upon a fluid world that has no "natural" dividing lines. So whenever we make use of a historical concept and investigate the cone of light it sheds on the evidence, we discover that the concept fits the evidence to perfection when applied to the denotata in the centre but less well as we move towards the periphery. And there is never a sharp demarcating line which separates the peripheral denotata from the peripheral denotata of neighbouring concepts. Thus, when we examine the denotata subsumed under a pair of opposed concepts – such as "town *versus* village" or "monarchy *versus* republic" or "state *versus* stateless society" – we invariably find a grey zone in which the denotata of the two allegedly opposed concepts do in fact overlap. If this overlap is taken as an indication that one's concepts are muddled and ought to be either adjusted or discarded, the result would be the demolition of all concepts and the end of all analysis of empirical data. Instead, matching the intension of a concept with its extension, we must focus first on the denotata close to the centre, and then, moving towards the periphery, we must simply allow a certain overlap with other concepts. On the other hand, to treat the central denotata only and just to ignore the peripheral ones would lead to a serious distortion of the analysis. One must investigate where the grey zones are and why they appear. This book is entitled *A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures*, but it comprises descriptions of thirty-four cultures and references to several more which share some of the characteristics of the concept of city-state culture as defined in the Introduction, but, in my opinion, not enough to be subsumed under the concept.

This method applies to all concepts studied in relation to their denotata. But not all concepts used by historians, however, are of the same kind: some are invented by the historians themselves sitting in their studies and are almost unknown outside universities, whereas others are developed and imposed by people in consequence of their living in society so that these concepts become an essential component of social life. The first set of concepts, often called heuristic concepts, are just for better understanding and analysing the history of mankind. Concepts of the second type have a life of their own. The obvious example to quote in this context is, of course, the concept of city-state as against the concept of state. "City-State" is a purely heuristic concept, probably invented in 1840 by a Danish professor of Latin (*supra* 599 with n. 8), later adopted by historians, archaeologists, anthropol-

ogists and students of political science, but never used by anybody who lived in a "city-state" to describe the society in question; and the concept of city-state has never been an issue in politics. "State" on the other hand is a concept which is important not just for understanding history, but for history in the sense of a course of events.[17] It is one which the Europeans have forced upon the entire world so that the globe today is subdivided into some 190 territorial states of which 187 are members of the United Nations.[18] In this case "grey zones" become red spots on any political map. It matters whether or not a political community is a state. Is Taiwan a state? and is there to be a Palestinian state? In these two cases the application of the concept of state has become an issue. The grey zone which a scholar might have allowed to persist can no longer be tolerated and is covered by concepts such as "an autonomous region" (which is *not* a state, see *infra* 607). The question about the statehood of Taiwan and the Palestinians has become a major political issue which may result in wars and will undoubtedly affect the course of history.[19]

I shall return later to the fact that city-state is a purely heuristic concept used by scholars in the social sciences but nowhere else (*infra* 606). It is the centre-periphery distribution of the denotata I want to treat first and, as suggested above, I shall begin at the centre. There can be no denying that city-state is an incisive and very precise description of, e.g., ancient Athens, medieval Siena or modern Andorra. The problem is – as always – to determine the extent of the concept and to delimit the city-state against other forms of political community and urban society. The main issues can be subsumed under three headings: (1) size of territory and population; (2) size and nature of the urban centre; and (3) degree of self-government required in order to count as a polity rather than a municipality.

(1) Size of Territory and Population

Athens, Siena and Andorra all possess territories so small that one can walk from the centre to the frontier in less than one day. The territory is confined to the surrounding area of the urban centre. It is what in German is called the *Umland* rather than the *Hinterland*. But how big can a city-state be before the identification of territory with *Umland* breaks down so that the community loses its character of being a city-state? A modern example illustrates the problem.[20] Kalmytskaya is a republic to the north of the Caucasus. Its population comes to ca. 320,000 and its territory to 76,000 km². About a quarter of the population lives in the capital, Elista, and the republic has no other major urban centre. Is Kalmytskaya, then, a city-state? Certainly not. The size of the territory alone renders it impossible to retain even the remotest aspects of a face-to-face society. Kalmytskaya is a macro-state – a so-called "territorial" state – which happens to have only one major urban centre. No one has ever, I think, called Kalmytskaya a city-state. Nevertheless, it fits the definition of city-state advocated by Toynbee and quoted above 597. In my opinion, there is one essential criterion missing from Toynbee's definition: a city-state is, essentially, a micro-state. With this further criterion added Kalmytskaya is *not* a city-state.

The other aspect of the size of the city-state concerns the population. As emphasised above the city-state is typically a small state, i.e. what we today call a micro-state. How big a population is compatible with being a micro-state? Most city-states have had a four- or five-digit number of inhabitants. A few city-states have had a population of over 100,000 persons. In such cases the character of being an urbanised micro-state may still have been preserved because the full citizens constituted only a fraction of the entire population. But when the population reaches a seven-digit number it is probably no longer appropriate to treat the community as a city-state. Singapore is a republic with a territory of 620 km² consisting of one very large city and a small hinterland. So from the geographical point of view it is obviously a city-state. But it has a population of close to three million persons. It is fairly often called a city-state,[21] but in my opinion erroneously. Other similar cases are Hong-Kong (until 1998), Hamburg (ca. 2,000,000 inhabitants) and Bremen (ca. 750,000 inhabitants).

With Kalmytskaya and Singapore in mind, let me review the problematical city-states included in this investigation, and let me add that one important reason for the exclusion of the Harappan cities, the *mahajanapada* states, the Celtic *oppida*, and the Viking cities in Russia is the enormous size of the territories ruled by these urban centres.[22]

1. From its foundation ca. 825 B.C. and down to ca. 450 Carthage was a city with a hinterland of, at most, a few thousand square kilometres (Ameling [1993] 248-9). During this period it was undoubtedly a city-state like the other Phoenician colonies. But between the mid-fifth and the third centuries B.C. it came to dominate long stretches of the coast of North Africa and Southern Spain and now possessed a territory of over 100,000 km². Furthermore, it controlled a good many

colonies in the Western Mediterranean (Niemeyer, *supra* 105). Aristotle's description of Carthage in *Politics* Book 2 Chapter 11 conveys the impression that the political organisation of the Carthagian state was like that of a Greek *polis*, which may be true, but it would be false to maintain that Carthage was still a city-state.

2. Almost all the Hellenic *poleis* had small territories; but there were a few notable exceptions. Attika covers some 2,600 km^2, and a citizen living in a remote village in eastern or southern Attika could reach Athens in a day's walk. Athens was large, but not too large to qualify as a city-state. Sparta, on the other hand, ruled all of Lakedaimon and Messenia, a territory of altogether 8,400 km^2, but all the Spartans lived near Sparta (Herodotos 8.234.2), and the rest of Lakedaimon and Messenia was dotted with between 50 and 100 perioikic *poleis* (Shipley [1997]). Syracuse is another example of an oversized *polis*. At its zenith in the 4th century B.C. Syracuse ruled about half of Sicily, i.e. some 12,000 km^2; but, again, inside the Syracusan territory were found a number of dependent *poleis*, and the political organisation of Syracuse itself was that of a *polis* (Lewis [1994]). In the eyes of the Greeks, Athens, Sparta and Syracuse were all *poleis*, and in spite of their large territories I find it justifiable to see them as city-states.

3. In 378 B.C. Roman territory had grown to 1,562 km^2 and the population to over 50,000 persons (Cornell, *supra* 215). So, both in size and population, Rome was still a city-state, but not for long. After the conclusion of the Latin War in 338 B.C. the territory ruled by Rome comprised ca. 5,500 km^2 and supported a population of ca. 350,000 persons, and in 264 B.C. the territory covered 27,000 km^2 inhabited by some 900,000 persons (Cornell [1995] 380). But the city-state had not been transformed into a unified macro-state with Rome as the capital. The provinces ruled by Rome were dotted with dependent city-states, and the nascent Roman empire in Italy can still be conceived as a city-state culture, see *infra* 614.

4. In the 12th century North Italy was split up into several hundred small states, most of which were city-states. But in the course of the next three hundred years Firenze, Venezia and Milano extended their sphere of power by conquering all their neighbours. By contrast with most other city-state cultures the Italian did not allow the defeated city-states to persist as dependent city-states. They became just cities lying in the victorious city-state's territory (Epstein, *supra* 287). Thus, when the peace of Lodi was concluded in 1454, Firenze, Milano and Venezia had become macro-states, with territories of, respectively, 12,000

km^2, 27,500 km^2 and 35,000 km^2, much too big to count as proper city-states. Firenze and Milano were principalities. Venezia, on the other hand, remained a republic and retained the political institutions created in the city-state period. The enfranchised part of the population was so small that all would know one another, and from this point of view the city-republic remained a city-state till 1797.

5. The Hausa *Birane* are another problematical case. "While the range in size varied as much as 10 to 13,000 square miles for large states such as Kano and Zaria, many of the smaller states could claim no more than a few hundred square miles" (Griffeth, *supra* 489). – The smaller states, e.g. Rano, cause no problems, but Kano and Zaria seem to have had territories of something between 26,000 and 34,000 km^2. That is incompatible with being a "city-state", unless dependent city-states with their hinterland were situated within the territory of the large *birane*; but this does not seem to apply to the Hausa. Presumably Kano and Zaria were originally city-states which by conquest came to dominate a territory so large that the state was transformed from a city-state into a territorial macro-state.

6. Like Rome, the Aztec city-state culture developed into a kind of macro-state ruled by an oversized former city-state. When Cortés came to Mexico the Aztec had been united into an empire ruled by the so-called Triple Alliance of Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tlacopan. The empire covered a core territory of some 18,000 km^2, but dominated a region which was at least five times as large. The alliance, however, consisted of over 500 city-states, ruled by three hegemonial city-states (Smith, *supra* 582, 585, 592).[23]

In conclusion: many city-state cultures included city-states which succeeded in subjecting the neighbouring city-states and thereby acquired territories much too large for a proper city-state. In some cases the conquered city-states became dependent city-states and the result was a hierarchically organised network of independent and dependent city-states (Sparta, Syracuse, Rome, Tenochtitlan). But in other cases the conquered city-states became municipal towns lying in the territory of the victorious city-state, and the result was a fairly small macro-state, which often retained some of the institutions characteristic of a city-state but no longer functioned as a proper city-state (Carthage, Firenze, Venice).

(2) Size and Nature of the Urban Centre

Up to and including Max Weber, the city was believed to be an aspect of civilisation peculiar to the western

world, and this orthodoxy applied both to the physical and the socio-political aspects of urbanism.[24] Max Weber argued that the oriental "cities" were essentially castles and royal palaces, sometimes with markets and other elements of a city as an economic centre, but without the essential political aspect of being a community of citizens (Weber [1921/1972] 733, 736-41). Weber's model of the city, however, has since been revised in two important respects: (a) many ancient nucleated centres outside the European cultural sphere were in fact major habitation centres and not only ceremonial centres surrounded by the necessary number of dwellings to house those associated with the palace or the temple. (b) Many "oriental" cities were in fact political and administrative communities and in this respect not essentially different from the ancient and medieval cities in Europe.

Re a: It is archaeological research which has paved the way for the study of urbanism as a global phenomenon and led to a revision of Weber's view of oriental cities as primarily castles, sanctuaries and palaces (Wilhelm [1997]). In this context it suffices to mention the excavations of large urban centres first in Mesopotamia (e.g. Ur, Babylon and Assur), then in the Indus valley (e.g. Harappa and Mohenjo Daro), and recently in Africa (e.g. Jenne-Jeno), in Meso-America (e.g. Tikal and Copan) and in the Far East (e.g. Chang'an and Luoyang).[25] A proper understanding of the new archaeological evidence was to some extent slowed down by the interpretation of the Mesopotamian urban centres as temple-cities (Schneider [1920]), a view which is now universally rejected as a misinterpretation (Glassner, *supra* 40-3; Mieroop [1997] 9); and the Maya centres were long taken to be monumental sanctuaries (Thompson [1954] 57) before archaeologists began to focus on the surrounding habitation centres (Grube, *supra* 553-6). Thus, the physical evidence of nucleated centres could at first be adduced *in support of* Weber's view that his ideal type of the city was peculiar to western civilisation; and an outright rejection of his opposition between the occidental and the oriental city is a recent development.[26] Consequently, to have general studies of urbanisation exemplified not by Mediterranean, but by Mesoamerican, Near Eastern and Asian cities happened only a generation ago with the work of, e.g., Adams (1966) and Wheatley (1971). The most recent study of the history of urbanisation covering the entire world is Southall (1998).

Re b: It is, *inter alia*, a more differentiated and nuanced understanding of the concept of the Islamic City which has resulted in a revision of Weber's view

that political institutions and autonomy are characteristics of the occidental city and not to be found outside the western cultural sphere. Urbanism is an essential aspect of Islamic society, and in consequence of the Arab conquests in the 7th century the Islamic city came to dominate the Middle East from Rabat to Isfahan.[27] Many ancient Roman and Byzantine urban centres were changed into Islamic cities and new cities grew up everywhere. The pre-industrial Islamic city was characterised by the mosque in the centre, the religious schools in its neighbourhood; the market with its *suqs*; the citadel lying next to the defence circuit; and the densely settled habitation areas, often subdivided into quarters, of which one was reserved for the ruling class and was sometimes centred on a palace.[28] From an urbanistic and economic point of view the Islamic city fits Max Weber's ideal type almost to perfection. But the political and administrative aspects of Weber's ideal type are missing. The typical Islamic city was not a *Stadtgemeinde*: it did not have an organised and self-conscious body of citizens, it did not have separate political institutions, and it did not possess autonomy either in the sense of independence or in the more restricted sense of self-government.[29] Thus, in this respect Weber's opposition between the occidental and the oriental city is vindicated. The Islamic city was a city in the urbanistic sense only; it was not a self-governing community.

This picture of the Islamic city, however, fits the old centre of the Islamic world: the Middle East, North Africa and Spain.[30] If we include Islamic civilisations in Africa south of the Mediterranean coast and in the Far East there are notable exceptions. In Sahara each of the five, later seven, Mozabite cities was a political and administrative unit (Jaabiri & Yahia, *supra* 447-50). In West Africa south of the Sahara the Hausa were settled in a number of cities, and each city was both the urban and the political centre of a small community (Griffeth, *supra* 483-4). In East Africa along the coast of Kenya and Tanzania a dozen stone towns were inhabited by Swahili-speaking Muslims, and again the stone towns were political as well as urban centres (Sinclair, *supra* 479). In the far east the Malay port-cities were political communities as well as trade centres (Reid, *supra* 422-4). The concept of the Islamic city is not destroyed by these examples. They are, by and large, exceptions, and they are found outside the central area of Islamic civilisation, i.e. the Middle East.

So much for Max Weber's ideal type of the ancient and medieval city as a *Stadtgemeinde*, i.e. as a polit-

ical and administrative centre. But the purely urbanistic criteria too sometimes have to be stretched to cover urban centres outside the European and Mediterranean world. Many historic cities in America, Africa and Asia were open structures and often very different in appearance from contemporary European cities. They were less often protected by defensive walls than their European counterparts, and some of them were not so densely inhabited that the houses stood wall to wall. Among the nucleated centres which are relevant in this context the Malay and Maya "cities" can be adduced as examples.

In the Malay cities almost all buildings were lightly built of wood, matting and split-bamboo. Houses of this type were not built to last more than ten years or so. Their great disadvantage in an urban setting was susceptibility to fire, but when devastating fires did occur, whole quarters of the city were rebuilt in three or four days. Even the palaces of the ruler and principal court officials were built in this fashion but in a grander style. Since all buildings were surrounded by coconut and fruit trees, visitors from the crowded, walled cities of Europe and China tended to think the Malay variant were not real cities at all, but rather "an aggregate of villages". Although the royal compound was often fortified, the city itself never was (Reid, *supra* 421).

By far the most problematical case is the Maya cities, which often had population densities of no more than ca. 6-10 persons per hectare. Tikal, for example, and its immdiate hinterland covered 120 km^2. The total population of the central 9 km^2 is calculated as ca. 8,000 during the late Classic. The remaining 111 km^2 of more rural areas within the "Tikal area" may have had a population of ca. 50,000 (Grube, *supra* 556). Nevertheless, when contrasted with the hinterland, the major Maya sites are recognisable as nucleated centres and judged according to their functions they may be – and often are – described as "cities" (Grube, *supra* 554). On the other hand, there can be no denying that by describing the Maya settlements as cities we have come close to the periphery of the concept of city in the sense of a nucleated settlement.[31]

Following Grube and Reid I believe that these "open" urban centres can reasonably be interpreted as counterparts of the European urban centres. Functionally they were centres of trade, they gave rise to a considerable division of labour and specialisation of function, and they were genuine *Zentralorte* in the economic sense of the term.

To conclude, we can safely dismiss Weber's view that a city organised as a *Stadtgemeinde* was a phenomenon found in the western world only. His contrast between *die okzidentale Stadt* and *die orientalische Stadt* has to be abandoned, and we must allow for cities which were political communities not only in Europe, but also in Asia, Africa and America.

The new interpretation of many nucleated centres outside Europe as both habitation centres and political communities has opened the historians' eyes to the view that some of these cities were city-states, and that clusters of such city-states formed what is here called a city-state culture. Until the mid-twentieth century the use of the term and concept of city-state was restricted to accounts of ancient and medieval European communities, including some Near-Eastern ones. It was only from ca. 1950, in consequence of the new understanding of urbanisation as a global phenomenon, that the concept of city-state has spread to the Mesoamerican,[32] African[33] and Asian civilisations described in this volume.[34]

(3) Degree of Self-Government Required in Order to Count as a State rather than a Municipality

How can we distinguish cities which were political units from cities which were administrative units only? Or to put it differently: where do we draw the line between cities which were states and cities which were just municipalities? As in the introduction I find it instructive to go back to Max Weber.

Max Weber's *Stadt* is not only an economic but also a political and administrative entity, and in addition to the purely urban characteristics Weber insists that a city must have its own law courts and its own institutions in possession of at least partial autonomy (736). Chronologically Weber's concept of *Stadt* is supposed to cover both ancient and medieval cities and geographically it comprises all occidental cities, but Weber adds that the medieval city north of the Alps is the one that fits his "Idealtypus" almost to perfection (741). Thus, when Weber speaks of *die Stadt* he includes, e.g., the Greek *poleis*, the Italian *città* but first of all the *Städte* in Germany, the Netherlands and other Northalpine countries. Of these a few were city-states – principally the German *Reichsstädte* – but most were cities in possession of a certain amount of self-government, but without (some of) the characterics which constitute a state as described in the introduction.[35]

In spite of the insistence on at least partial autonomy, Weber's *Stadt* is not necessarily a city-state, and it is worth noting that, in his article *Die Stadt*, he

hardly ever uses the term *Stadtstaat* in his descriptions of the Greek, the Roman and the medieval cities.[36] On the other hand, the ancient Phoenician and Palestinian cities are occasionally called *Stadtstaaten*.[37] When the emphasis is on the political and administrative aspects of the classical and Medieval city, he speaks instead of *Stadtgemeinden*.[38] Weber describes *die Stadt* as both a political and an administrative unit without distinguishing between the two aspects. He investigates the ancient and medieval cities as urban *communities*. That some of them were actually *states* is of little importance from his point of view.

A similar approach is found in Henri Pirenne's study: *Les villes du moyen age* (1927). Again, the political and administrative aspects of the medieval city are treated (125-55); but no position is taken on the question which of them were states and which municipalities.

The next major study of the city as a political community was *La ville. Institutions Administratives et Judiciaires* (1954), a collective volume covering cities in over a dozen different civilisations. In the introduction (13-18) John Gilissen suggests distinguishing between (1) la ville souveraine, ou quasi-souveraine, (2) la ville privilégiée, jouissant d'une certaine autonomie, (3) la ville de statut administratif. His examples of (1) are the classical Greek and Sumerian cities, the *Reichsstädte* in Germany and Switzerland, and some modern cities such as San Marino. Examples of (2) are the Hellenistic cities and the medieval European cities. No examples of (3) are adduced, but it goes without saying that all the major cities of all large states fall into this category. We have here a tripartition instead of a dichotomy. The concept of city-state is avoided as well as the term ("ville" is preferred to "cité", and "État-cité" does not occur). If the concept of city-state had been adopted, it would have covered all cities in the first group and some of those in the second, so that the second group would have been split up into two.

The two first important treatments of the political aspects of urbanisation to be written in English were R.M. Adams, *The Evolution of Urban Society* (1966) and Paul Wheatley's *The Pivot of the Four Quarters* (1971).[39] They both studied political differentiation and institutionalisation in early cities. In both cases the focus was moved from Europe to other continents and the point of departure was the ceremonial centre, either a temple or a palace or both. Adams describes the rise of urbanism in Mesoamerica and Mesopotamia; Wheatley treats China in the Shang and Zhou periods. Adams occasionally uses the term city-state

(e.g. 101, 153) but never comes to grips with the concept. Wheatley almost dismisses the city-state in a footnote as constituting "a special case",[40] and the Zhou cities are described as administrative rather than political centres (161-90).

The next work to be mentioned here is Charles Tilly and Wim Blockmans, *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe A.D. 1000 to 1800* (1994). The theme of the study is the interaction between cities and states, and in their introduction the editors correctly note that this is a neglected issue. The concept of city-state is frequently invoked but, in conformity with the approach, city-states and major trading cities are grouped together and contrasted with the consolidated states ruled by princes and monarchs. In the conclusion (218-50) Blockmans distinguishes between three categories of cities: (1) autonomous cities, (2) bargaining cities (i.e. those that bargained with princes and nobility for some degree of freedom) and (3) subordinated cities. Some of the autonomous cities are explicitly called city-states, e.g., Dubrovnik and Novgorod (226-7), but it would probably be rash to infer that they all were. Of some of the bargaining cities, *viz.* the larger Flemish towns in the 14th century, it is stated that they "displayed a tendency to develop city-states" (228). Blockmans' categorisation is very close to that of Gilissen and the distinguishing characteristic is, again, the degree of autonomy.

A very different line is taken in the recent study by Southall (1998) which covers the history of cities in all continents from the 7th millennium B.C. and to the present day. He does take the political aspects of urbanisation into account, but does not distinguish cities which were polities from cities which were municipalities. He holds that "the first cities were all city-states"[41] and, without any precise description of what a city-state is, he applies the term to, e.g., Çatal Hüyük, Jericho and Uruk (16), Ife and Jenne-Jeno in Africa (44), Hierakonpolis in Egypt (37) and Teotihuacan in Mexico (50). To take city-state status as a transitional phase in the history of every single early city in world history is, in my opinion, a misuse of the concept. Most pristine cities were not city-states but just cities in macro-states; i.e. they were administrative but not political units. Or, to put it in German: they may have been *Stadtgemeinden*, but not necessarily *Stadtstaaten*. There is no evidence to support the view that Çatal Hüyük, or Jericho, or Jenne-Jeno were organised as city-states. It is most unlikely that Teotihuacan or Harappa were city-states. And Hierakonpolis was probably an urban centre in an early Egyptian state, but not a city-state. There have never

been city-states in Scandinavia or in England; Medieval Germany had several thousand cities of which only a hundred or so developed into city-states. There were no city-states in Northern France and Southern Italy, nor any in Spain and Eastern Europe, etc.

These publications are, I believe, the most important treatments of the political aspects of urbanism. In other studies of urbanism and urbanisation the interest in the political aspects is minimal. Christaller's theory about *Zentralorte* (1933) concerns almost exclusively the economic aspects of the town as a central place,[42] and, to the best of my knowledge it has not yet been supplemented with a complementary theoretical exposition of the city as a central place in politics and administration.[43] In Gordon Childe's epoch-making article (1950) the political criteria are marginalised;[44] and the books by Sjöberg (1960), Mumford (1961) and Bairoch (1988) contain next to nothing of relevance.

The overall conclusion is that only a few major urban studies have treated the political aspects of urbanisation and in those that do, the concept of city-state is sometimes used, but is not in focus. Mostly city-states, capitals and municipal cities are treated together, and no attempt is made to distinguish city-states from more or less self-governing cities in macro-states.

The picture changes when we move from the study of urbanism to the study of statehood. Those whose focus is political systems, and particularly the city-state, take a different line (*supra* 597-8). For them it is essential to find out what difference there is between a city which is also a state and a city which is just a municipality. The distinguishing criteria almost always invoked are "independence" and "autonomy", and they are often treated as synonyms.

Now, to define a city-state as an independent political unit runs counter to the fact that most city-state cultures consisted of city-states of which some were independent but others were dependencies. The dependencies were either members of a "federation" of city-states, or simply subject either to a large city-state belonging to the same city-state culture, or to a neighbouring monarchy or an empire. Thus, to insist on independence as a defining criterion would lead to the exclusion not only of a high number of individual city-states within each city-state culture but even of several city-state cultures, *viz.*, (1) the Syrian city-states when ruled by the Hittites or by Egypt, as well as those dominated by Ebla; (2) the Palestinian city-states when under Hyksos or Egypt; (3) the Phoenician city-states in the homeland, at least in the Late Bronze Age and again in the late 8th century, as well

as the Mediterranean colonies apart from Carthage; (4) the Philistine city-states except for the period between ca. 1000 and 800 B.C.; (5) the Neo-Babylonian city-states; (6) about half the Hellenic *poleis* in the later Classical Period and almost all in the Hellenistic Period; (7) the Latin *civitates* after 338 B.C.; (8) the *hiberno-Norse towns* from the late 10th century; (9) the Dutch city-states after 1579; (10) the city-states on the fringes of the Taklamakan desert, torn between Chinese and Mongol domination; (11) the Chinese city-states under Shang and Western Zhou; (12) the Yoruba city-states in the Oyo empire; (13) the Kotoko city-states under the Bornu empire; (14) the Fante city-states under the hegemony of Mankessim; (15) the Swahili city-states under Portuguese and Omani domination; (16) Sriwijaya as a city-state culture; (17) some of the Malay *negeri* after ca. 1520; (18) most of the Tai müang; (19) most of the Maya city-states for most of the Classic period; (20) most of the Aztec *altepetl*; (21) the Mixtec city-states after ca. 1450.[45] The principal city-state culture in which independence seems to have been an essential criterion for being a city-state is the Italian[46] and only a few of the other city-state cultures seem to have conformed to the Italian model.[47] For some of the city-state cultures in some periods the answer to this question is a *non liquet*.[48]

This survey demonstrates, I believe, that a rigid application of independence = external sovereignty as a *sine qua non* for being a city-state would cut many city-state cultures into halves, and place the dividing line in a awkward place, one which would be incomprehensible for the peoples in question, and from the modern historian's point of view it does not lead to a meaningful historical analysis either. The problems of classification were first discussed by Plato. In his later dialogues he devoted much energy to the issue and recommended the principle "to cut at the joints".[49] In so far as human history has a skeleton I find that the best a historian can do is to adopt Plato's principle. I cannot see that anything is gained by constructing a heuristic concept of city-state which runs counter to the concepts used by almost all the peoples who are supposed to have lived in city-states.

The reason why independence is usually singled out as the most important aspect of the city-state is probably a tendency to think of the city-state along modern European notions of statehood: if the city-state is a type of state, and if independence is an essential characteristic of a state, then a city-state must be independent.[50] The problem with this syllogism is not just the conclusion – many city-states were

in fact dependencies – it is also the second premiss. Independence is still commonly listed as a criterion for statehood[51] – but is it not an anachronism, here at the turn of the millennium, to make independence a cornerstone of the concept of state?[52] Independence is usually represented as one aspect of sovereignty, the concept of sovereignty being subdivided into external sovereignty (i.e. independence and the capacity to enter into relations with other states) and internal sovereignty (i.e. the supreme authority to make and enforce a legal order within the state's territory over its population).[53] By distinguishing between two aspects of sovereignty we end up having a number of states which possess one aspect of sovereignty without the other. By and large, federal states are organised in such a way that external sovereignty rests with the federal government while internal sovereignty is divided and mostly belongs to the government of each of the members. Thus, "A federal state is a union of several sovereign states" and "Since a federal state is itself a state, side by side with its member states, sovereignty is divided between the federal state on the one hand, and, on the other, the member states."[54]

The European Union is an example of a different division of sovereignty, in this case internal sovereignty. The Union's institutions have not (yet) arrogated any powers related to external sovereignty, and each member is still in possession of its full right to enter into relations with other states. Unlike a federation, the European Union does not count as a state in itself. Yet, the supranational organs of government interfere with the internal sovereignty of the members. The Council of Ministers passes two different forms of decision: *directives* which require further implemention by each member state before they take effect, as against *regulations* which take effect immediately when passed by the EU, and are valid in all the member states regardless of what the government and parliament of a member state decide. Thus, the EU is different from most other alliances regulated by a treaty in that numerous decisions made by the EU authorities take effect automatically in all member states, and thus the EU interferes with the internal sovereignty of the member states.[55]

In the modern world, as in all periods of history, we meet not just a horizontally organised number of "independent states" (which may conclude treaties and form alliances), but rather a mixture of states of equal standing side by side with often vertically organised hierarchies of states: some states are dependent states, some are independent states and some are hegemonial states. Such hierarchies were promi-

nent in most of the city-state cultures, but, admittedly, not in all: two prominent examples of absence of dependent city-states are medieval Italy and Switzerland. For these two city-state cultures, independence seems to be *the* criterion by which city-states were distinguished from city municipalities. But in most other city-state cultures *independence* is not an essential characteristic of the individual city-state and to have independence as the single most important characteristic of the concept of city-state has severely obscured a proper understanding of many city-state cultures.

To emphasise autonomy as the essential criterion of statehood is even worse, because in all the major European languages autonomy is an ambiguous term which can denote anything from the sovereignty of states to the self-government exercised by constituent states or provinces or even local communities.[56] In phrases such as "an alliance of autonomous states" it is used synonymously with independence about a state. But the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993 ended with a treaty by which the Gaza strip and Jericho became "autonomous areas"; and here the adjective is used in the sense of "self-governing" about communities which are certainly *not* states.[57] In recent years the concept of autonomy is increasingly identified with self-government and explicitly contrasted with independence, and, concomitantly, it is applied to political units which stand midway between municipalities and states and are called "autonomous republics" or "autonomous provinces". In most such cases the point in using the concept of autonomy is precisely to avoid the concepts of state and independence.[58]

If we follow the older tradition and equate autonomy with independence, the concept suffers from the shortcomings described above. If, on the other hand, autonomy is taken in its contemporary and more restricted sense of self-government (often = internal sovereignty), where are we to draw the line between the autonomous state and the municipal town which is often described as "self-governing" or "quasi-autonomous" or in possession of "local autonomy"?[59]

To conclude, neither independence nor autonomy provides a satisfactory criterion by which we can describe and delimit the concept of city-state. Independence is too restrictive and autonomy too ambiguous. To avoid the ambiguity that autonomy is sometimes used synonymously with independence, we may instead speak of self-government, and my recommendation is to adopt "self-government" as one of the caracteristics of a city-state. The class of city-

states, then, consists of independent city-states *plus* dependent city-states in possession of self-government, to be equated with internal sovereignty.

Unfortunately, to speak of self-governing city-states instead of independent or autonomous city-states solves only half the problem. The other half is that "self-government" is a term applied not only to cities which were states, i.e. city-states; it is also commonly used about cities which were municipalities.[60] To the best of my knowledge, there is no other concept at hand, and, in order to distinguish self-governing city-states from self-governing municipalities we must desist from finding some single abstract criterion and adopt a different method: we must list a number of institutions and powers which characterise a community as a polity, and compare these characteristics with an opposed set of institutions and powers which mark the city as a merely administrative unit.

A city which is a polity has institutions empowered (a) to legislate, (b) to pass and enforce verdicts and sentences, especially sentences of death and exile, (c) to impose taxes and exact customs, (d) in cities with a monetary economy to strike coins, (e) to call up and command the adult male members of the community for service in the armed forces, (f) to worship divinities and organise cults peculiar to the community, (g) to enter into relations with other political communities, including the right to declare war, conclude peace and enter into alliances. – It makes no difference whether the "institutions" in possession of these powers are a monarch and his court, or a number of different, sometimes republican, organs of government such as assemblies, councils, law courts, magistrates, or priests.

A city which is merely an administrative unit may or may not possess the same set of institutions, but at the same time the city has an overlord empowered (h) to exact tribute, customs and taxes, (i) to levy troops, (j) to overrule political decisions and verdicts passed by the city's legislature and courts, (k) to impose and enforce (some of) his own laws, (l) to demand allegiance from the city's authorities. The term "overlord" is here used in a broad sense. It was mostly a monarch, but could also be, e.g., a bishop, or the government of another city-state, or a federal government set up by a number of city-states.

The two sets of criteria are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A city could have its own army but still be obliged to furnish troops when requested by the overlord.[61] It could have its own system of taxes and customs but still have to pay tribute to the overlord.[62] Or it could pass its own laws about some matters but

in others be forced to follow legislation imposed by the overlord.[63] It could be forced to use the overlord's coins or to strike coins with the overlord's types and legends alongside some coins with its own types and legends.[64] Sentences passed by the city's courts could be final except in case of appeal.[65]

A city is certainly a state, and thus a city-state, if it possesses all the powers listed as (a-g) and is unconstrained by those listed as (h-l). But how many and which of the first set of characteristics can be supplemented with or replaced by the second set before the city changes its status from a political to a purely administrative unit? Again, there is no clear dividing line that can be applied to all city-state cultures in all periods. In medieval Italy the right to impose capital punishment seems to have been a distinguishing mark of a state and a right which a city lost when conquered by another city and reduced to the status of municipality.[66] But in Germany not only the free and imperial cities, but also many of the cities ruled by feudal lords possessed the right to condemn an offender to death and have him executed.[67] Similarly, in several of the French consulate cities the consuls possessed jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases and the feudal overlords did not interfere with their administration of justice.[68]

In the end, a crucial criterion is a people's own conception of where the line has to be drawn. If the population of a city had a strong sense of political identity as opposed to their ethnic identity, was this identity linked to their city or to a larger unit of which their city was only a part?[69] In the former case, it was probably what we call a city-state, in the latter it was an urban centre lying in a state of some other type. It might still be, basically, self-governing but if it had no aspiration to count as a political unit, it would be very odd indeed to take it to be a state. Most European cities are of such a type, and have always been. But self-governing cities which considered themselves to be political units were, probably, what we call city-states.[70] What constitutes the difference between a city-state and a city-municipality is a feeling of local patriotism which over the generations induces a sense of political separateness and historical difference (Smith [1986] 61) and membership was often expressed in terms of citizenship (*ibidem* 165). Self-identification, however, is not always enough.[71] Sometimes a sense of political identity was strongly felt by the inhabitants of a city, but contested by their neighbours. In such a case one possible criterion to go by is recognition of political status by the other political units within the region.[72]

Although the German cities did not form a city-state culture, Germany in the late Middle Ages may serve as an example: in the German Empire there were some 3-4,000 towns of which about a hundred counted as "free" or "imperial" cities, whereas the rest were "territorial" cities, i.e. lying in "territorial states" ruled by princes or bishops. The free cities did not pay homage to anybody. Like the princes, the imperial cities paid homage to the emperor; the territorial cities paid homage to their prince who, again, paid homage to the emperor. Only the princes and the free imperial cities were represented at the *Reichtag* at Regensburg. Thus, like the states ruled by princes, the free and imperial cities were believed to be political units in a class of their own; they were also self-governing, and it seems reasonable to treat the free and imperial cities as states, i.e. city-states, but to treat the territorial cities as municipalities, in spite of the fact that some of the territorial towns possessed as much self-government, perhaps even more, than some of the free and imperial cities (Johanek, *supra* 296-7).

To conclude, a people's own conception of what constitutes a political unit may matter even more than the actual amount of self-government exercised by such a unit. In Assur, for example, the citizens seem to have been conscious of forming what we would call a political community, i.e. a state, but at the same time they seem to have been conscious of the fact that their distant trading posts were *not* political but rather administrative units (Larsen, *supra* 84-5). Similarly, in ancient Greece a clear distinction was made between *poleis* (of which some were independent but some dependencies) and civic subdivisions at municipality level, such as the Attic *demoi* or the Argive *komai* (Hansen, *supra* 170-1). Again, the Maya emblem glyphs strongly indicate that there were over thirty political – and not just administrative – units, each centred on what can reasonably be called a city (Grube, *supra* 549-50).

Why City-States instead of Macro-States?

Why did state formation result sometimes in the emergence of a macro-state with numerous cities and sometimes in a city-state culture? The usual explanation is geophysical. However, if emphasised in isolation, it does not hold up to scrutiny. A number of other explanations can be suggested but none is satisfactory if adduced in isolation or emphasised as the principal cause. What I can do here is to list some possibilities and leave it to future investigations to test them against the evidence.

1. The Geopolitical Factor. It is usually argued that city-states are likely to emerge in a mountainous region split up into small plains or plateaus (Griffeth & Thomas [1981] xi). Such an explanation seems obvious in the case of Syria or Hellas.[73] Other environments have been conducive to the same geopolitical result, i.e. the fragmentation into city-states. One scenario is a string of coastal cities whose hinterland is an impenetrable jungle, e.g. the Malay city-states; another is a desert with a number of oases, each with an urban settlement, e.g. the Taklamakan and Arabian city-states.[74]

That geophysical conditions are indeed conducive to the formation of city-states is undeniable but must not lead to geographical determinism. Southern Mesopotamia is as flat as a pancake, but was nevertheless broken up into city-states. The Hausa city-states were situated in a well-watered grassland zone and there are no obvious natural borders between the city-states. Again, the Mzâb settled down in an oasis, but formed five small densely set city-states instead of just one. Conversely, macro-states have often emerged in a mountainous country split up into small pockets of land fit for human habitation. Medieval Norway is one such example. Again Greece seems to have been settled in city-states only once in history. If the geophysical factor were decisive we should expect the country to have been split up into city-states not only in classical antiquity, but also earlier in the Bronze Age and again later, in the Middle Ages.

2. The Economic Factor. A combination of economic and geographical factors sometimes provided optimal conditions for the formation of city-states. As has often been argued and as is fully corroborated by this study, there is a close link between city-states, colonisation and commerce. The city-state cultures studied in this volume testify to three different scenarios.

a. Major caravan roads passed through cities and new cities grew up along the road to serve the needs of the itinerant traders. Some of these cities belonged to macro-states, but cities lying in thinly populated regions or cities emerging where the caravan road passed through no man's land tended to be or to become city-states. If a string of such city-states were inhabited by people belonging to the same ethnic group, the result was a whole city-state culture. One obvious example is the caravan road connecting Mesopotamia with the Gulf of Aden. It passed Palmyra, Petra, and came down through a number of caravan-cities in Western Arabia, including Medina, Mecca and Aden. For a short period in the 3rd century

A.D. Palmyra was an isolated city-state. Petra belonged first to the Roman and then to the Byzantine empire. But the caravan-cities in Arabia were all independent cities connected by the caravan road, and they belonged to what can presumably be described as a city-state culture flourishing in the last centuries before Muhammad (Shahîd [1970] 20-5; Simonsen, *supra* 241).

b. Commercial cities often grew up in the interface between cultures and such cities were often city-states. Assur with Kanesh is such a city-state connecting Mesopotamia with Anatolia in the 19th century B.C. (Larsen, *supra* 80-1). An example of a city-state culture consisting of such towns is the Niger Delta city-states which grew up in the sixteenth century A.D. in connection with the Atlantic slave trade but in the course of the nineteenth century were transformed into towns in the British colony of Nigeria (Princewill, *supra* 533-45).

c. Colonisation was undoubtedly the most important socio-economic factor behind the formation of city-states. When colonists were sent out by their mother country to found a colony, or of their own accord left their mother country for that purpose, they usually had to settle down in a foreign and sometimes hostile environment. Their obvious response would be to found a nucleated and often fortified settlement with, at first, a small hinterland. In some cases the colony was subjected to stern political control from the mother country, but in other cases the colonists would have to create a social and political organisation from scratch. Such a colony became a self-governing community, and often a city-state. The Phoenician and Hellenic city-states are clear examples. (Niemeyer, *supra* 96-104 and Hansen, *supra* 147-50).

A different scenario is when a whole city-state culture emerges in consequence of immigration into a region by a people who from the outset settle down in city-states. Two such city-state cultures are the Philistine city-states all founded by immigrants into southern Palestine just after 1200 B.C. (Strange, *supra* 133, 136), and the Aztec city-states founded by invaders from the north ca. 1200 A.D. (Smith, *supra* 584).

3. The Chronological Relation Between Urbanisation and State Formation. There is a case for arguing that an important factor in state formation was whether it took place before or after the urbanisation of the region. As pointed out in the Introduction, state formation and urbanisation were usually closely related processes; sometimes state formation antedated ur-

banisation by a century or two; but sometimes urbanisation took place simultaneously with or even before state formation. When state formation came first, the result was mostly a macro-state with a number of towns being founded shortly afterwards, often under the auspices of the ruler(s) of the new state. If urbanisation came first, or the two processes were simultaneous, there was a fair chance that each new city became a political unit, i.e. a city-state, and that the whole region formed a city-state culture.

To cite some examples: in Anglo-Saxon England and in Scandinavia in the age of the Vikings, the state emerged in a period in which the village was the only known form of nucleated settlement, but the growth of proper towns was promoted or sometimes even instigated by the kings.[75] In all cases the results were macro-states covering large territories, and the only city-states in this part of the world were the Hiberno-Norse colonies founded in Ireland by, especially, Norwegian Vikings (Holm, *supra* 252-4). Conversely, urbanisation came early to the Netherlands and Italy. In both regions powerful rulers were remote and the formation of macro-states slow, and that was probably one reason why city-states were found in great numbers.

The same pattern is attested in ancient history too. In Egypt urbanisation has now been brought back to dynasty 0 (*supra* 23), but even at this early date (ca. 3300-3100 B.C.) Upper Egypt seems to have been a large state, which gradually came to dominate Lower Egypt as well,[76] and there are no remains of towns which could match the Sumerian cities of the same period. Conversely in, e.g., Etruria and Latium. In both regions the formation of cities seems to have antedated state formation or, at least, the two processes took place simultaneously and in both cases the result was a city-state culture.[77]

In many cases, however, it is impossible to say whether urbanisation or state formation came first. And there are other examples which indicate that the chronological sequence of the two processes was not decisive for whether the region became just one state or was split up into a number of city-states. One civilisation which, apparently, contradicts the above rule is the Hellenic city-state culture. The prevailing view seems to be that state formation took place in the eighth century B.C., whereas urbanisation in the proper sense cannot be dated much before the late sixth century.[78] Recent excavations, however, indicate that urbanisation was much earlier, especially in the regions in which city-states are first attested (Hansen, *supra* 161). So, urban centres grew up in Hellas

simultaneously with the emergence of the early city-states. If that is the case, the Hellenic city-state culture is not an exception to the observation about the sequence of the two phenomena.

4. Acculturation. City-state cultures are attested in Europe (including the Near East), in East Asia, in West and East Africa and in Mesoamerica. There can be no doubt that in each of the four continents, city-states emerged independently of what happend in the other three continents. In all four continents, however, city-state cultures tend to appear in clusters and it is tempting to surmise that in such cases the city-state type spread from one civilisation to the neighbouring regions. In some city-state cultures there is explicit evidence of such an acculturation.

The city-state cultures along the Fertile Crescent can be adduced as an example: the Neobabylonian city-states evidently copied some of the Sumerian institutions (Larsen, *supra* 118). The Philistine city-states seem to have been modelled on the Palestinian and Phoenician city-states to the north (Strange, *supra* 132). It has been argued that the Greeks got not only the alphabet but also the *polis* from the Phoenicians.[79] Again, the Etruscan and Latin city-states may to some extent have been modelled on the Greek city-states in Sicily and southern Italy.[80]

In other continents, however, acculturation seems a less obvious explanation of why city-state cultures appear in clusters. And here Meso-America may serve as a case in point. The Aztecs came to Meso-America from the north and seem from the outset to have settled down in city-states. That happened ca. 1200 A.D. (Smith, *supra* 584). The classical Maya city-states had disappeared 300 years earlier (Grube, *supra* 547, 560), and there is no apparent link with the Mixtec city-state culture until later. Similarly, the Mixtec city-states emerged after the demise of the Maya city-states (Lind, *supra* 568). Although Precolumbian Meso-America was a cluster of city-state cultures, there is not yet sufficient evidence to show that acculturation was an important factor in the formation of city-states and city-state cultures.

5. Devolution. In quite a few cases a city-state culture emerged not *ab novo* but by fragmentation of an urbanised macro-state into a number of city-states. The collapse of an urbanised macro-state sometimes entailed the collapse of the urban centres as well as of the state itself, and in such cases the result was a "dark age" of sometimes several centuries. In other cases, however, (some of) the urban centres survived the collapse and then the most likely development was the formation of a city-state culture composed of a number of city-states. Examples are the Chinese city-states in the Zhou state in the Spring and Autumn period 771-481 B.C. (Lewis, *supra* 359), the Neo-babylonian city-states in the first millennium B.C. (Larsen, *supra* 117-18), the Swiss city-states after the extinction of the Dukes of Zähringen in 1218 A.D. (Stercken, *supra* 322-3), and the second cycle of Maya city-states in the period 1450-1600 (Grube, *supra* 561).

6. Re-appearance. Some regions were divided into city-states only once in world history, e.g. Hellas ca. 750 B.C. – ca. 550 A.D., Northern China 780-480 B.C., and Nigeria 15th-19th century A.D. In other regions city-state cultures disappeared but then re-appeared after a certain period. In some of these cases the two periods of city-state culture are separated by a "dark age". Examples are the Syrian and the Palestinian city-state cultures. In other cases the two periods are separated by the formation of a macro-state which, again, collapsed. Thus, the Etruscan and Italian city-states in Tuscany were separated by the Roman Empire followed by the German migrations. The two cycles of Maya city-states were separated by the Mayapan state (1150-1450). The Sumerian and Neobabylonian city-states were separated by the Old Babylonian Kingdom and the Kassite Dynasty. The inference seems to be that some peoples and some regions were more predisposed to the formation of city-states than others. What lay behind this predisposition may be some of the factors listed above.

It is apparent from the above list that no single factor can be stressed as a universal cause; and in many city-state cultures several of the factors listed seem to have been brought into play at the same time.

Conclusion of the Conclusion

I presume that the present attempt to delimit and describe the concepts of city-state and city-state culture will be met with the question: and so what? Are there some major trends in world history which stand out better than before when we contrast macro-states and city-state cultures? I think so and let me end this exposition by drawing attention to some such trends.

(1) Political Decision-Making

Throughout history and until the second half of the eighteenth century all the large so-called "territorial" states were monarchies. Many city-states, perhaps even the majority, were monarchies too, but due to the small size of city-states quite a few became republics,

i.e. states ruled by councils and assemblies in which decisions were made by vote after a debate.[81] And even in monarchic city-states there is not infrequently evidence of debating and voting councils and assemblies.[82] The republican city-states were mostly oligarchies but sometimes democracies. The oligarchies were ruled by councils and magistrates elected from among the well-to-do citizens; in democracies the principal political institution was often a popular assembly. The essential characteristic common to both types of constitution is that decisions were made in meetings, by majority verdict, and after a debate among the participants. It is this form of political culture which dominates the contemporary world. What matters in this context is that it has its roots in the city-state cultures. It can be traced back to the Sumerian city-states; it is well known from the European city-state cultures; it is also seen in some African and Asian city-state cultures.

The dispersed occurrences show that this aspect of the city-state is not due to a tradition whereby an oligarchic and/or democratic form of political decision-making was transferred from city-state culture to city-state culture. The reason why an oligarchic or democratic form of government was peculiar to city-states is probably that, in former times, such a form of political culture was likely to grow up everywhere in the world, but only in micro-states; and almost all micro-states were city-states.[83] So, in some city-state cultures scattered all over the world this form of political decision-making emerged independently of what happened in other city-state cultures.

In our part of the world, however, there seems to be a tradition that links the modern political systems to the historic city-state cultures. In macro-states the major shift from monarchical to republican government took place in Europe and in North America in consequence of the American and French Revolutions.

In Europe the adaptation of democracy to macro-states can be traced back to the French Revolution. The "chief ideologist" was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His preferred form of constitution was an assembly democracy as known from some city-states.[84] His historical ideal was Rome in the early republican period when, he believed, all citizens could still meet in the *comitiae*.[85] His contemporary ideal was his native city of Geneva, which he mistakenly thought to be a democracy. It was in fact an oligarchy.[86] But that is of no consequence in this context. What matters is that Geneva was still a city-state in the 18th century and that the republican and democratic ideology practised

in modern macro-states has its root in a city-state culture.[87]

If we want to trace the idea of republicanism further back, the two thinkers who tower above all others are Montesquieu and Machiavelli. I shall come back to Montesquieu in the next section and confine myself to a few remarks about Machiavelli. He is best known for the small treatise *Il principe*, in which a main theme is how a prince can maintain his power base, his *stato*. But Machiavelli's preferred form of state was the city republic, the *città*, which he outlines in his other major treatise: *Discorsi sopra la prima decca di Tito Livio*. Now, the first ten books of Livy's work cover the history of Rome down to 293 B.C. Furthermore the Roman constitution is debated in the first of the three books of Machiavelli's treatise and here almost all examples are drawn from the first six books of Livy's account ending at 387 B.C. Machiavelli focuses on the early period when Rome was still a city-state and a balance could be maintained between the *plebs* and the senate (1.4).[88] So, around 1500, when Firenze, Venezia and Milano could hardly be described as proper city-states any longer, the adored ideal was still the republican city-state ruled by its citizens.[89] But in the course of the 16th century the picture changed. In political thought republicanism was overshadowed by the belief in monarchy as the best form of constitution; and on the political stage the remaining city-state cultures were eventually suppressed and succeeded by the large monarchies with their colonial domination of the rest of the world. It is almost ironical that the monarchies, in turn, had to give way to political systems which had been developed in city-state cultures and, before the late 18th century, had existed in systems of micro-states only. This observation applies not only to republicanism, but to federalism as well.

(2) Federalism

After the American war of Independence the thirteen former colonies introduced in 1787-9 a federal constitution according to which sovereignty was divided between the thirteen member states and the federal government.[90] Consequently, there was no sovereign in the classical sense (according to which sovereignty is indivisible).[91] The antifederalists saw such a constitution as a monstrosity.[92] But the champions of federalism argued that there were historical examples demonstrating that such a political system was not only viable; if improved and adapted to the political situation it was also the best solution. The principal histor-

ical examples of federalism adduced during the debate in 1787-9 were the Greek Amphictyonic Council of the archaic and classical periods and some of the Hellenistic federations, particularly those formed by the Achaians and by the Lycians. Another example was the Swiss Confederacy of 1291; and a third was the Dutch Republic in the years after the Union of Utrecht of 1579.[93]

On the one hand, these historical examples were adduced as models in order to show that federalism was a possible way of governing a cluster of states, each in possession of internal sovereignty. On the other hand, the earlier confederations were sometimes denigrated, especially the ancient Greek federations of city-states,[94] in order to emphasise the superiority of the new American form of federalism. And the federalists were very much aware that the essential difference was that a system hitherto confined to microstates was for the first time ever transformed and applied to a macro-state.[95] During the debates leading up to the ratification of the American constitution in 1789, the most frequently quoted political treatise was Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois*. In Book 9 he argues that republics are typically small states and that their security is best protected by forming federations. Holland, Switzerland and Germany are the more recent examples referred to, and of historical federations the Lycian federation of twenty-three city-states is singled out as a model for this type of state-formation.[96] There are, of course, important differences between the various Greek, the Swiss and the Dutch federations.[97] The crucial point in this context is that in all cases the models for the American federal constitution were found in city-state cultures.[98]

If we want to look further back in the history of modern western political thought for the origins of the idea of federalism, the most obvious example is Thomas More's *Utopia*. At the beginning of Book 2 we learn that there are fifty-four cities on the island, identical in language, customs, institutions and laws. The nearest are twenty-four miles apart. Each is a political community, ruled by a prince elected for life; but they form a federation whose political centre is the city of Amourot.[99] So, More's *Utopia* is an obvious instance of the close link between federalism and city-state culture.

Today several of the largest states in the world are organised as federal states.[100] Thus, a dominant form of political organisation is found to be based on ideas and institutions developed in several different city-state cultures and only adapted to macro-states in the second half of the eighteenth century.

The creation of federal states has changed the concept of state significantly, although the change is not always sufficiently recognised. In the USA a "state" is principally one of the member states as opposed to the federal government: New York and Pennsylvania are states, but so is the USA, for example in its capacity of being a member of the UN.[101] Now, a state is typically defined as "a territory, a people and a government in possession of the sole right to enforce a given legal order within the territory over its population" (*supra* 12-13). According to this definition a member state of a federation is a state in the true sense of the term. But at the same time the federation is a state. It can no longer be claimed that a state is a state and that, in principle, all states are equal. We have got states within states and a hierarchical concept of state.[102] In a sense we have come back to the hierarchical organisation of states found in many city-state cultures in which self-government, but not necessarily independence was the requirement for being a city-state, and in which an alliance or a federation of city-states was the preferred way of creating larger political units.

(3) City-State Empires

Federalism was not the only way of creating larger political structures within a city-state culture. An alternative was what I prefer to describe as empires of city-states. Historians often contrast city-states and empires.[103] The prevalence of dependent city-states in many city-state cultures, however, sometimes resulted in a fusion of these two forms of political organisation, *viz.* an empire composed of city-states. A proper recognition of this cross-breed of political cultures has been obscured by the *a priori* assumption that independence was one of the defining characteristics of the city-state (*supra* 606). Once the concept of the dependent city-state has been brought into play, the existence of empires in some of the city-state cultures leaps to the eye. Let me begin with an example from my own city-state culture, *viz.* the Hellenic *polis*.

1. In the Archaic and Classical periods the Lakedaimonian *polis* Sparta ruled the regions of Lakedaimon and Messenia, a territory of altogether some 8,400 km². The other Lakedaimonians and the Messenians were subjected to Sparta; many became serfs (helots), but more than fifty nucleated centres were allowed to persist as dependent *poleis*: they were ruled by Sparta but still in possession of a substantial amount of self-government. Thus, we are faced with a hierarchy of *poleis*, and the political structure is neither an alliance

nor a federation. Sparta is probably best described as partly the centre of a *polis* of Spartans, and partly the power centre of a small empire of dependent *poleis* all populated by Lakedaimonians (Hall [2000] 73-89).

2. Rome was originally a Latin city-state but by the mid-third century B.C. it had grown into a macro-state: it had subjected all the other Latin city-states and the Etruscan city-states as well (Cornell [1995] 345-68). Most of the Latins became Roman citizens, and most of the Etruscans became subject allies. But in both regions the city-states were allowed to persist as dependent political communities (Cornell, *supra* 215). Rome's expansion during the next two centuries followed the same lines and in the first century B.C. Rome was a former city-state which had been trans-formed into the political centre of an empire con-sisting, essentially, of dependent city-states: *poleis* in the east (Hansen, *supra* 148) and *civitates* in the west (Cornell, *supra* 211).[104] All these over 2,000 de-pendent city-states were slowly transformed into municipalities. In the west the change took place during the Principate, but in the east the demise of the city-state was a much slower process, and there were still dependent *poleis* in the political sense in the 6th century A.D. (Hansen, *supra* 149).

3. From the 7th to the 11th centuries A.D. a Bud-dhist Malay polity ruled a large part of southern Sumatra. It was called Sriwijaya, a name which denoted both the state and its urban centre, now iden-tified with modern Palembang. A 7th century inscrip-tion demonstrates that Sriwijaya ruled a circle of self-governing communities each of which seems to have been what can reasonably be described as a dependent city-state (Manguin, *supra* 409-15).

4. In 1428 A.D. three large Mexican city-states, Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tlacopan, joined to form an Aztec empire. The empire was of "hegemonic" form, employing indirect control of its provinces, and the city-state remained the primary political unit. The Aztec empire can be viewed as an overlay upon a foundation of city-states who retained their self-gov-ernment in the face of reduced external autonomy (Smith, *supra* 591-2).

5. Ca 1600 A.D. the city-state (*ilu*) of Oyo began its conquest of the greater part of the savannah region of Yorubaland in the northern part of the Niger valley and brought many hitherto independent *ilu* under its control. But the dependencies retained their own hereditary rulers. They had to pay tribute and supply contingents to the Oyo army, and their verdicts could be quashed by the *Alafin*, as the ruler of Oyo was called. But in many respects they remained polities

and were not just transformed into what we would call municipalities. They were still *ilu* in the political sense. Oyo was on its way to becoming "a territorial 'post-city-state' (though not really getting there)" (Peel, *supra* 510). The "empire" was more or less identical with its urban centre, and the preferable analysis of the political system is to assume that the Alafin and his "messengers" ruled an empire con-sisting of the Oyo city-state and a large number of dependent city-states (Peel, *supra* 512-14).[105]

(4) Population and Economy

Urbanism is one of the foundations of the modern economy, and in contemporary industrialised coun-tries over 70% of the population live in large urban centres, whereas less that 30% are settled in the coun-tryside. Until ca. 250 years ago the percentages were reversed: worldwide some 80-90% of all human beings seem to have lived in farmsteads or villages with no more than 10-20% settled in towns or cities.[106] A much higher degree of urbanisation, however, is attested in regions organised into city-states.[107] Insofar as we possess any evidence about the settlement pat-tern of city-state cultures, the people living in towns and cities constituted at least one quarter and often as many as three quarters of the total population;[108] and this high degree of urbanisation was of the utmost importance not just for the political organisation but also for the economy of the communities.

By and large, a low degree of urbanisation goes with a high degree of subsistence economy and, con-versely, urbanisation is linked to a market economy based on trade. The size of the urban populations alone necessitated a large-scale traffic in foodstuffs. Much came from the town's immediate hinterland, including that brought to the town by *Ackerbürger*,[109] but much of the trade in grain or rice or maize was long-distance.[110] The recognition of trade as a crucial aspect of city-state culture, however, has for some time been obscured by a dominant primitivistic inter-pretation of the economy of, especially, the ancient world.

In the beginning of this century ancient historians stressed the similarities between the classical city-states of Greece and Rome and the Medieval Italian city-states: division of labour and, consequently, the importance of trade were singled out as crucial char-acteristics of, especially, the Hellenic *poleis*, and the economy of Greek and Roman society was sometimes described in terms otherwise used about contempo-rary industrialised societies.[111] A reaction set in with

the publication in 1928 and 1931 of two monographs by the German historian Johannes Hasebroek. He argued that the importance of trade, and especially long-distance trade in archaic and classical Greece was insignificant and had been grossly overrated. At first, Hasebroek's work met with massive opposition,[112] but after about a generation his views were vindicated by, especially, A.H.M. Jones and M.I. Finley, in whose view the ancient Greek and Roman economy was, essentially, an agrarian subsistence economy (Finley [1965], [1973]). The clash of views is often referred to as an opposition between "modernism" and "primitivism", and for more than a generation "primitivism" has been the dominant, not to say the orthodox view. The concern was primarily with ancient Greece and Rome, but the views were launched under the label "The Ancient Economy" and it was believed, *a fortiori*, that they applied to the entire Mediterranean world from the dawn of civilisation. In this context it suffices to quote Finley's successor, Keith Hopkins, who in 1983 succinctly summarised the position held by Jones and Finley: "the new orthodoxy stresses the cellular self-sufficiency of the ancient economy; each farm, each district, each region grew and made nearly all that it needed. The main basis of wealth was agriculture. The vast majority of the population in most areas of the ancient world was primarily occupied with growing food. To be sure there were exceptions (such as classical Athens and the city of Rome), but they were exceptions and should be treated as such. Most small towns were the residence of local large-landowners, centres of government and of religious cult; they also provided market places for the exchange of local produce and a convenient location for local craftsmen making goods predominantly for local consumption. The scale of inter-regional trade was very small."[113]

In recent years there has been a noticeable reaction against the "primitivistic" model.[114] On the other hand, it has been reinforced by the introduction in the 1980s of landscape survey in Mediterranean archaeology. The focus of interest has shifted from the towns towards the hinterland and, as a result, the agricultural subsistence economy practised in households is still emphasised at the expense of trade linked to the harbours and markets of the urban centres.[115]

But simultaneously with the emergence of the "primitivistic" interpretation of what was called "the ancient economy", the opposite theory was advanced by one of the most prominent economists, *viz.* John Hicks (1969). Investigating the rise of the market, and looking for the context in which the market economy

is most likely to have emerged, he points to the city-state. And referring to the Greek, Phoenician, Etruscan, Italian and German city-states he describes what he calls the first phase of the Mercantile Economy as follows: "The core of the city state, regarded as a trading entity, is a body of specialized traders engaged in external trade. They are trading, in part, with merchants in other city states; the whole body of traders, in mercantile relations with one another, over the whole group of city-states, constitutes the Mercantile Economy, the system of people and relations between people which we are to study. Even in this wide sense the Mercantile Economy is still an Open Economy, which exists by trading with people outside it" (Hicks [1969] 42-3).

Hicks possessed a restricted knowledge of ancient and medieval history, and some of his observations concerning specific city-state cultures do not stand up to scrutiny.[116] Yet the present historical study seems to corroborate the validity of Hicks' *model* and to disprove the "primitivistic" view of, primarily, the classical world. The Greek and Roman city-states appear in a new perspective when seen in connection with all other city-state cultures. The most recent volume about trade and traders in the ancient city includes a chapter by A. Kuhrt about Assur and Kanesh, largely based on Larsen's work. It is as far removed from the primitivistic model as can be, and lends strong support to some of the other studies in the same volume which emphasise the importance of trade, including long-distance trade (Parkins & Smith [1998] 16-30). To adduce just a few examples I may quote Perikles' praise of Classical Athens: "the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so that to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as those of his own" (Thucydides 2.38), or the Portuguese description of one of the Malay city-states: "Melaka has nothing of its own, and has everything of the world" (Reid, *supra* 420) or Bernal Diaz' impression of the Aztec markets: "On reaching the market-place ... we were astounded at the great number of people and the quantities of merchandise ... You could see every kind of merchandise to be found anywhere in New Spain."[117] One of the major results of the present investigation has been to demonstrate the close connection between city-states and trade, and to emphasise long-distance trade as one of the essential links which could hold together the different city-states of a city-state culture.[118]

To sum up. Republicanism and federalism are major aspects of modern statehood which stem from city-

state cultures and, before the late 18th century, they were almost exclusively found in city-state cultures. Urbanisation and trade are fundamental and interconnected aspects of modern society; they too were prominent aspects of most city-state cultures; here the city-states were not alone, but alongside the major cities in macro-states they were at the forefront as long as they were allowed to exist. On the other hand, the fragmentation of city-state cultures into small political units made them vulnerable when they were confronted by macro-states. And when a city-state culture became organised as a city-state empire, it was gradually transformed from a region with multiple polities into a macro-state with multiple urban centres. City-state cultures have disappeared, and isolated city-states are few and far between. But some basic ideas and some important social and political institutions emerged in city-state cultures and were characteristic of city-state culture until the late 18th century when they became adapted to macro-states.

Notes

1. Two examples are Mogens Trolle Larsen's description of the Assyrian city-state (1976) and Philip Jones' of the Italian city-state (1997).
2. It is noteworthy that Toynbee's definition leaves out the criterion of small size, see *infra* 601.
3. For a critique of Trigger's views, see Wilson (1997) 230-1. I confess to being more in sympathy with Trigger's model than with Wilson's critique of it.
4. The study comprises a number of civilisations which were *not* split up into city-states according to the definitions suggested in the introduction to the volume. Nor do these civilisations fit the concepts of city-state and city-state culture described in the introduction to this volume *supra* 16-9. The civilisations in question are: Egypt (*supra* 23), the Indus culture (*supra* 23-4), Okinawa, Central Mexico from ca. 1700 B.C. to ca. 1200 A.D. (*supra* 584) and Peru.
5. Submitted to the National Research Foundation in 1991 and published in Hansen (1994) 10-13. The ideas suggested in this original research programme have been developed and refined, especially in consequence of the symposium held in January 1999. For the updated version, see the introduction *supra* 16-9.
6. For Teotihuacan, see 584; for Harappa, see Kenoyer (1997) 54 and *supra* 23-4, 375-7.
7. The chapters in question are those about the Celtic *oppida* by John Collis, the Viking towns in Russia by Neil Price, the German city-states by Peter Johanek, and the Indian *mahajanapadas* in the Early Historic Period by Dilip Chakrabarti.
8. The English term *city-state* was probably coined in 1885 as a rendering of the German term *Stadtstaat* in connection with the translation into English of J. Bluntschli, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (6th edn. Berlin 1886) 63 = *Theory of the State* (London 1885) 60. The German term *Stadtstaat* was probably coined in 1842 as a rendering of the Danish term *Bystat* (*by* = town, cf.

Derby) in connection with the translation into German of J.N. Madvig, *Blik på Oldtidens Statsforfatninger med Hensyn til Udviklingen af Monarkiet og en omfattende Statsorganisme* (Copenhagen 1840) 20 n. 2 = *Blicke auf die Staatsverfassungen des Altertums, mit Rücksicht auf die Entwicklung der Monarchie und eines umfassenden Staatsorganismus* in *Archiv für Geschichte, Statistik, Kunde der Verwaltung und Landesrechte der Herzogthümer Schleswig, Holstein und Lauenburg* (Kiel 1842) 42. The terms *Bystat* and *Stadtstaat* were first applied to Rome in the republican period, and only later transferred to descriptions of, primarily, the Greek *polis* and the Italian *città*. The French term *cité-État* and the Italian term *città-stato* are both derived from *Stadtstaat* and/or *city-state* and neither is attested earlier than the 20th century.

Again, all the self-governing towns in the eastern part of the Roman empire were called *poleis* in Greek, but *civitates* in Latin (when the political aspect was stressed) or *urbes* (when the urban aspect was stressed), see Marquardt (1881) I 78-9; Ward-Perkins (1998) 371. In the medieval and Renaissance periods, Greek *polis* = Latin *civitas* was rendered *cité* in French (attested in Nicolas Oresme's translation of Aristotle's *Politics* [ca. 1375] republished by A.D. Menut [Philadelphia 1970] 45), *città* in Italian (attested in Machiavelli, *Il Principe* [composed in 1513] 5, 7 etc), and *city* in English (attested in Thomas Elyot's summary of the opening of Aristotle's *Politics* in *The Image of Governance* [London 1540] 267). For a full account, see Hansen (1994a) 18-22 and (1998) 15-16.

9. Berve (1951) 135; Meier (1995) 703; Cartledge (1998) 139. For a judicious opposition to such views, see Walter (1998). The relation between the concepts of *polis* and state is discussed in Hansen (1998) 114-23.
10. For very clear formulations of this common view, see the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt ([1958] 375-6; 383-4), and the American political scientist David Easton ([1971] 109), both quoted *supra* 28 note 23.
11. In several modern accounts the people are even emphasised as the most important of the three elements: territory – people – government. See, e.g., Raphael (1975) 609; Doehring (1987) Oppenheim (1992) 121; cf. Hansen (1998) 38-9.
12. Finley (1963) 45. See also Polanyi (1960) 333: "the Greek polis was not a city in the modern sense, but a state."
13. Most recently by Murray (1996) 1205 and Lehmann (1997) 368. For a dissociation of the concept of *polis* from the concept of *autonomia*, see Hansen (1998) 78-83.
14. Finley (1981) 4-5; Kolb (1984) 59; Baurain (1997) 278.
15. Aristotle's term for self-sufficiency is *autarkeia*, which he uses in (a) an economic and (b) a moral sense. Re (a). Aristotle does *not* hold that economic self-suffiency is a characteristic by which the *polis* can be distinguished from larger political units (called *ethne*). His point is that, in the evolution of society, the *polis* is the first community which reaches the level of self-sufficiency (*Pol.* 1252b29; 1326b8). From an economic point of view larger units, like *ethne*, are as much or perhaps even more self-sufficient than the *polis* (*Pol.* 1326b3-4). Re (b). On the other hand, *autarkeia* becomes a distinguishing criterion of the *polis* when understood in a moral sense and taken to denote a population large enough to include a sufficient number of morally valuable human beings (*Pol.* 1261b11; 1326b8). – Thus, when *autarkeia* is seen as a purely economic concept the limit is a mininum, and *autarkeia* increases with size. But as a moral and demographic concept *autarkeia* is a mean between a minimum (a population so

small that the result is a lack of worthy persons as citizens) and a maximum (so many citizens that they cannot know one another and form one community in the proper sense of the term). Again, when wealth is judged from a moral point of view, Aristotle holds that affluence is as bad as poverty and that *autarkeia* in this respect is, once again, a mean, i.e. to possess the necessaries of life but no surplus beyond that (*Pol.* 1256b32). Precisely the same basic ideas lie behind Plato's description in *Resp.* 369B & 372E of the emergence and development of the *polis*. See *supra* 18.

16. For the Nigerian historians, see *supra* 504. For a criticism of the Marxist interpretation of Chinese history, see Tu Cheng-sheng (1999) 425.

17. A concept may, of course, change its status over time. Thus, the concept of state took shape in the 16th and 17th centuries as a heuristic concept principally used by philosophers, and was transformed into a politically important concept only in the course of the 19th century.

18. In addition to the – presently – 187 members of the UN a few other political communities must be described as states, *viz.*, Switzerland, the Vatican City and two groups of minute islands in the Pacific: Tonga and Tuvalu. Taiwan and Northern Cyprus are *de facto* states, but the former is prevented by China from membership of the UN and the latter is denied recognition as a state by all states except Turkey.

19. Whereas the invention of a purely heuristic concept only occasionally results in the emergence of a "historic" concept, there is nothing to prevent a scholar from using a "historic" concept as a "heuristic" concept as well. Thus, state is primarily a historic concept applied from the mid-17th century onwards to European states, but, especially in this century, it is used in the social and political sciences as a heuristic concept as well, see *supra* 12-3.

20. Adduced by Glassner, *supra* 35.

21. Toynbee (1970) 54-5; Griffeth & Thomas (1981) xv, 201, 204 n.7; Charlton and Nichols (1997) 2.

22. See Hansen, *supra* 17; Chakrabarti, *supra* 389; Collis, *supra* 233, 237; and Price, *supra* 270-1.

23. The Aztec city-state culture poses a different problem: in some cases an urban centre seems to have been inhabited by people belonging to two different city-states. One solution is to assume that political affiliation in such cases was not bound to the territory but to personal allegiance, see *supra* 589 & 16.

24. Liverani (1997) who adduces Jacob Burckhardt (1870/1929) 65 as one of the principal forerunners of Weber's views of the *Stadtgemeinde* as a European phenomenon. The authors of the articles in Meier (1994) seem to take it for granted that Weber's distinction between the occidental and the oriental city is still valid, see especially 8-9, 59-63.

25. Mesopotamia: Maisels (1993); India: Kenoyer (1998); Africa: Shaw, Sinclair, Andah & Okpoko (1993); East Asia: Wang (1982), Barnes (1992); America: Nichols & Charlton (1997).

26. Wheatley (1971) 372; Liverani (1997) 107.

27. Morris (1994) 365-401.

28. Marçais (1928); Hourani (1970); Coquery-Vidrovitch (1993) 108-48. See Reid, *supra* 421; Griffeth, *supra* 489-91.

29. Hourani (1970) 13: "[Weber's] definition does more or less correspond to what Europeans would think of as a city, and if we accept it then we must also accept his conclusion that Near Eastern cities are not cities in the full sense. Of his five marks two at least are missing in the Islamic city ... It had no legal privileges conferred by the state ... nor, apart from some rare exceptions (some short-lived municipal bodies in Spain and North Africa), did it possess autonomy." Lapidus (1973) 47: in the Middle Eastern city "no single community included all residents of the city, for every citizen population was divided into various parochial bodies, several religious communities, and many residents, such as the state elites, who belonged to no particular group. Nor did any magistrate or council speak for the whole of a citizen population." See also Cocquery-Vidrovitch (1993) 111. It must be added, however, that Weber (1921/1972) 739 decribes the Arabian cities in the Age of Muhammad as well as some of the Islamic cities as proper analogies to the ancient *polis*.

30. For Spain see the note about the Andalusian Taifa states, *supra* 24.

31. In modern India the census requirements for being a city are (1) more than 5,000 inhabitants; (2) a population density exceeding 1,000 to the square mile; (3) more than 75% of the adult males must be engaged in work other than agricultural (Wheatley [1972] 620). 1 square mile = 2.4 square km. Thus, with a population density of 6-9 per ha = 1400 – 2100 per square mile, Maya cities just meet the density requirement.

32. Maya: Thompson (1954) 81-2. It is worth noting that Thompson availed himself of the concept of city-state in spite of the fact that, in 1954, he took the Maya "cities" to be ceremonial centres and not cities in our sense of the word (*ibidem* 57).

33. The concept of city-state was applied to the Niger Delta states by Dike (1956) 30-4.

34. van Leur (1934/1955) see Reid, *supra* 418 with note 5.

35. Among the named cities adduced as examples by Weber are Arnhem (729), Athens (732 *et passim*), Cologne (730), Constantinople (740), London (762), Moscow (729), Rome (732 *et passim*), Venice (758), Wiesbaden (729) etc.

36. Weber (1921/1972) 731 (Medieval or ancient); 784 (ancient Greek); 743, 803 (Medieval Italian).

37. Weber (1921/1972) 739 (Juda and Phoenician city-states). At 746 Weber speaks about "die Polis Jerusalem". See also Weber (1921) 17, 35-41, 90, 109. In (1921) 180, however, there is a reference to Sumerian *Stadtstaaten*. I am grateful to Prof. Eckart Otto for providing me with the references to Weber (1921).

38. Weber (1921/1972) 744, 745, 747, 753, 757, 764, 790, 795. Like von Below (1898) 4 *versus* 16 *et alibi*, Weber seems to distinguish between the German *Stadtgemeinden* and the Italian *Stadtstaaten*.

39. Let me add that the political aspects of urbanisation were seriously discussed in some of the contributions to the 1958 symposium entitled *City Invincible* (Kraeling & Adams [1960]).

40. Wheatley's use of the concept of city-state is rather ambivalent. On the one hand, he says that "all generated cities were in their earlier phases city-states" (398) – a view also found in Southall (1998) 4 – but on the other hand he holds that "the city-state appears to represent a developmental phase of socio-political organization in which, it is true, the city exercises the sovereign powers of a state government. But this type of city constitutes a special case" (400 n.3).

41. Southall (1998) 4. For a similar view, see Hammond (1972) 2: "The term city-state could be applied in general to the government of any community defined as a city, whatever its political pattern." See also Wheatley (1971) 398: "all generated cities were in their earlier phases city-states."

42. Christaller (1933), see also Wheatley (1971) 614-19.

43. See, however, Meynen (1979) and especially Kiessling (1979) 184-92.

44. The political aspects of urban life are only vaguely referred to in Childe's list of ten criteria, *viz.* no. 3 (surplus paid paid to a deity or a king); no. 5 (ruling class), and no. 10 (state organisation).

45. Dependent city-states in city-state cultures: (1) Syrian (*supra* 60, 62, 64); (2) Palestinian, (*supra* 74); (3) Phoenician (*supra* 90, 101, 103, 105); (4) Philistine (*supra* 133, 136-7); (5) Neo-Babylonian (*supra* 118, 122, 126); (6) Hellenic (*supra* 148-9, 153, 170-2); (7) Latin (*supra* 211, 215, 220); (8) *hiberno-Norse* (*supra* 254, 258); (9) Dutch (*supra* 346-8, 353-4); (10) Taklamakan (*supra* 393-6); (11) Chinese (*supra* 359-67); (12) Yoruba (*supra* 513-4); (13) Kotoko (*supra* 531); (14) Fante (*supra* 519, 524, 528-9); (15) Swahili (*supra* 475-80); (16) Sriwijaya (*supra* 411-2); (17) Malay (*supra* 422); (18) Thai (*supra* 432-3); (19) Maya (*supra* 550, 552. 559-61); (20) Aztec (*supra* 585, 588, 591-2); (21) Mixtec (*supra* 576, 578).

46. In this context it suffices to quote the 13th-century political philosopher Bartolo of Sassoferato: "civitates tamen que principem non recognoscunt in dominum et sic earum populus liber est ... possent hoc forte statuere, quia civitas ipsamet sibi princeps est." Bartulus ad D. 4.4.3, n.1 (fol 133r) quoted from Canning (1987) 97 n. 15. See also Epstein, *supra* 277 note 4. For the view, however, that many subject cities were still – to some extent – polities, i.e. dependent city-state, see Chittolini (1991) 598-9.

47. The Assyrian, the Swiss, the Mzâb, the Hausa and the Niger Delta.

48. It is, for example, unknown whether the Sumerian city-states were allowed to persist as dependent city-states under the Ur III dynasty or whether they were reduced to the status of municipal cities, so that the city-state culture disappeared until the fall of the dynasty in ca. 2000 B.C., see *supra* 20 with note 93.

49. *diatemnein kat' arthra* = to cut at the joints, Plato, *Phaidros* 265E.

50. See, e.g., Gawantka (1985) 9 n. 1: "Da ein *un*-autonomer Stadt*staat* evident ein Widerspruch in sich wäre, ist hier über-zeugender S. Aisaka, *Die Staatsidee der griechischen Polis*, Osaka, 1983, 1, der als die 'Charakteristik des Polisstaats' benennt: "Bekanntlich verstanden die Griechen unter der Besonderheit der Polis ihre 'Autonomie und Freiheit.'"

51. Cf., e.g., Kelsen (1946) 249; Finer (1997) 2; Nicholson (1998) 120.

52. Oppenheim (1992) 123: "A state normally possesses independence, and therefore sovereignty. Yet there are states which are not legally independent. All states which are under the suzerainty or protectorate of another state, or are member states of a federal state, belong to this group". Conze (1990) 1: "Es gab souveräne Fürsten, die nicht über einen Staat geboten, so wie es Staaten gab und gibt, die nicht souverän sind".

53. This bisection of sovereignty goes back to Hegel who in (1821) §278 distinguished between "Souveränität *nach innen*" and "Souveränität *nach aussen*". The distinction is now universally acknowledged, see, e.g. M. Duverger (1966) 15-16 who sets *la souveraineté dans l' état* against *la souveraineté de l'état*. See also Zippelius (1989) § 10.1 (64); and Pierson (1996) 47-50.

54. Quoted from *Oppenheim's International Law* I (9th edn. Harlow 1992) 248-9. The theory of divided sovereignty was advanced by Tocqueville (1992) 126-7, 422-31 = *De la démocratie en Amerique* (1835-40) I.1.8 and I.2.10. It was developed by Waitz (1862), and, although it was rejected by, e.g., Jellinek (1914) 502ff, it seems to be almost universally accepted, see the above quote from Oppenheim. See also Finer (1997) 378.

55. See, e.g., Rochère (1996) 49-56 and the verdict of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the case Costa v. ENEL of 15 July 1964. Doehring (1987) 426 notes that "the member States of the European Communities, it is true, partially waived their sovereignty, but they did not completely abolish their independence."

56. The *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* illustrates the meaning of the adjective by the phrase: "an alliance of autonomous states" (5th edn. 1995). Both meanings are recorded in *Collins Dictionary of the English Language* (2nd edn. 1986) "(1) possessing a large degree of self-government; (2) independent". The same ambiguity applies to the German and French terms as well. For the German terms *Autonomie/autonom*, see, e.g., *Duden Das grosse Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache* 1 (1976) "[Verwaltungsmässige] Unabhängigkeit, Selbstständigkeit: die Autonomie dieses Landes ist gefährdet; Die Autonomie der Fraktionen stellt das politisch bedeutsamste Gegenwicht gegen autokratische Tendenzen dar". For the French terms *autonomie/autonome*, see, e.g., *Le petit Larousse compact* (1993) "Indépendence, possibilité de décider, pour un organisme, pour un individu, par rapport à un pouvoir central, à une hierarchie, une autorité. *L'autonomie des universités*" compared with *Dictionnaire Hachette encyclopédique* (1994) "Indépendance qui jouissent les pays autonomes".

57. The agreement itself is called "Declaration of Principles of Interim Self-Government Arrangements", and in the document the term self-government is the only term used, but in the subsequent political debate "autonomy" has frequently been used synonymously with "self-government". See *United Nations General Assembly Security Council A/48/486 S/26560 of 11 October 1993* compared with the Israeli Government's report of 2 June 1994: *The Middle East Peace Process, an Overview* 7-8, where Gaza and Jericho are referred to as "autonomous areas".

58. Elazar (1994) xii: "among the new developments are entities within polities which possess autonomy or home rule in one form or another". ... xvii: "currently functioning examples of autonomy or self-rule, ranging from classic federation to various forms of cultural home rule, were identified in 52 different states." For several scores of such a use of the concept of autonomy, see the collection of *Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights* in Hannum (1993).

59. Internal autonomy (Niemeyer, *supra* 101); administrative autonomy (Epstein, *supra* 281); political and administrative autonomy (Epstein, *supra* 288); for the distinction in medieval Germany between independent cities (*Reichsstädte*) and autonomous cities (*Autotonmiestädte*) see Johanek, *supra*. For the autonomy of the cities of the Hanseatic League, see Johanek, *supra* 305. In general discussions of city-states it has become fairly common to speak about "degrees of autonomy", see Burke (1986) 151; Clemente (1991) 643.

60. For "the self-governing but dependent commune opposed to the city-state", see Epstein, *supra* 277. For the self-government of almost all the cities of the German Empire, see Johanek, *supra* 306.

61. The Phoenician cities were requested to furnish ships to the

navy with which Sargon II attacked Cyprus and to the navy with which Xerxes attacked Greece, see Harden (1971) 115.

62. Thus in the 15th century both Brunei and Melaka became tributaries of the Chinese emperor in order to position themselves as entrepots with the sole legal access to the Chinese market, see Reid, *supra* 419.

63. Montepulciano and Grosseto were rather substantial towns which in the 14th century were ruled from Siena. But both had "their own constitutions, city councils, treasurers and other officials, local police forces, property taxes, and at times even a Guelf party organization." (Bowsky [1981] 8-9).

64. Lucca was under Pisa in the years 1342-69, but still had a mint and issued its own coins (the Copenhagen Coin Cabinet possesses some). Also, Bologna (Renaissance and later) had its own mint and issued two different series, one series of papal coins and one issued by Bologna itself, sometimes inscribed POPULUS ET SENATUS BONON; or e.g. obv: PIUS VI PONT MAX; rev: BONON DOCET.

65. Under the Oyo Empire the ruler of each Yoruba *Ilu* was the supreme judge within his own community, but his decisions could be quashed by the Alafin, the ruler of Oyo, see *supra* 513.

66. Subjected boroughs, towns and cities retained some self-government, but their right to be tried in their own courts was normally restricted to civil cases, see Jones (1997) 570-2.

67. The city of Lemgo was a *Hansestadt* belonging to Lippe. In the second half of the 15th century administration of justice, even in criminal cases, rested with the city's council, not with the *Landesherr*, see Meier-Lemgo (1962) 129-31.

68. Timbal (1956) 358-9; in some other consulate cities, however, jurisdiction in criminal cases rested with the feudal overlord.

69. Of the leaders of the Persian fleet in 480 B.C., the three Phoenician commanders are identified by their city (Sidon, Tyros and Arwad), whereas the others are identified by their region (a Cilician, a Lycian, a Cypriote, and a Carian) (Herodotos 7.98).

70. For the sentiment of political loyalty to the individual city-state, see Smith (1986) 61-3, 83-4, 99, 165.

71. An extreme case is that reported by Peel: the chiefs of Isaobi, a Yoruba village or perhaps even a hamlet, referred to their community as an *Ilu*, i.e. a city, or even a city-state (*supra* 513).

72. Even under Assyrian domination the rulers of the five Philistine cities are referred to in Assyrian documents as being kings, which indicates that the Assyrians saw the cities as dependent political units, not just as cities in a province, see Strange, *supra* 136.

73. For Syria, see Thuesen, *supra* 64; for Hellas, see Thomas (1981) 44; Baurain (1997) 403.

74. For the Malay city-states, see Manguin, *supra* 413 and Reid, *supra* 417. For the Taklamakan city-states, see di Cosmo, *supra* 393. For the Arabian city-states, see Simonsen, *supra* 242.

75. Anglo-Saxon states: Arnold (1997) 211-30; Scandinavia: Andrén (1994) 128-34; Olsen (1989) 27-32.

76. Kuhrt (1995) 132-4; Baines & Yoffee (1998) 216-18.

77. Etruria: Torelli, *supra* 195-6. Latium: Cornell, *supra* 212.

78. Hansen, *supra* 161, citing Kolb and Morris.

79. Burckhardt (1898/1952) I: 59; Gschnitzer (1988) 291-3; Demand (1996) 15; Niemeyer, *supra* 109.

80. Heurgon (1957) 64-6; Torelli (1986) 51-3; Colonna (1986) 431.

81. Republican city-states: Greek (*supra* 165-7); Etruscan (*supra* 191, 195, 198-203); Latin (*supra* 221-3); Italian (*supra* 279, 283-5, 288-90); Swiss (*supra* 322-4); Dutch (*supra* 343-54); Mzâb (*supra* 448); Swahili (*supra* 460-1, 480); Ibadan of the Yoruba (*supra* 513-4); Banda-Neira of the Malay (*supra* 422).

82. Councils and assemblies attested in monerchically ruled city-states: Sumerian (*supra* 43-7); Assyrian (*supra* 84); Phoenician, especially Carthage (Ameling [1993] 67-97); Irish (*supra* 259); Swahili (*supra* 480); Niger Delta (*supra* 536-7); Chinese (*supra* 368-70). In 1645 the ruler of a Fante city-state was fined by the town council (*supra* 525).

83. Examples of non-urbanised micro-states are some of the small Swiss Cantons, notably Schwyz, Uri and Unterwalden (*supra* 16), and some of the nomadic states on the fringes of the Taklamakan desert in central Asia (*supra* 396-7).

84. Rousseau (1964) 404-6 = *Du Contrat Social* Book 3 Chapter 4; 907-8 = *Constitution pour la Corse*. Miller (1984).

85. Rousseau (1964) 425-6, 444-58 = *Du contrat social* Book 3 Chapter 12 & Book 4 Chapters 4-6.

86. Rousseau (1964) 111-21 = *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité*, "Dedicace". Dent (1992) 126-8.

87. Rousseau (1964) 361 = *Du contrat social* Book 1 Chapter 6, note: Le vrai sens de ce mot [Cité] s'est presque entièrement effacé chez les modernes; la plupart prennent une ville pour une Cité et un bourgeois pour un Citoyen. Ils ne savent pas que les maisons font la ville mais que les Citoyens font la Cité.

88. Bock, Skinner & Viroli (1990).

89. Skinner (1978) I: 41-2, 53-4, 79, 109, 158-9.

90. *The Federalist* no. 32, of 2 Jan. 1788, by Hamilton; Tocqueville (1992) 126-7, 422-31 = *De la démocratie en Amerique* (1835-40) I.1.8 and I.2.10.

91. Nettl (1968/1994) 19; Skocpol (1985) 22; MacCormick (1987) 583.

92. McDonald (1985) 276-80.

93. Madison's notes on the debates in the Federal Convention, 19 June, 2 & 6. *The Federalist Papers* nos. 9, 16 (Hamilton); nos. 16, 18-20, 42-3, 45 (Madison).

94. E.g. James Wilson in the Constitutional Convention on 6 June; Hamilton in the first section of *The Federalist* no. 9. See Richard (1994) 103-15.

95. E.g. Hamilton in *The Federalist* no. 9.6-9.

96. Montesquieu (1951) 369-72 = *De l'esprit des lois* Book 9 Chapters 1-3. Shklar (1990) 274-9. The Antifederalists often repeated Montesquieu's claim that all republics had to be small, see Richard (1994) 114-15.

97. The Swiss *Eidgenossenschaft* of 1291 was originally an alliance between three small non-urbanised communities: Swyz, Uri and Unterwalden. But by 1501 eight cities had joined the *Eidgenossenschaft* and by the Stanser Verkommnis of 1481 it was turned into a confederation dominated by city-states, see Stercken, *supra* 325. Other possible examples of city-state federations are the five Philistine city-states (Strange, *supra* 135); The Mzâb pentapolis united under the *Halqa* (Jaabiri, *supra* 452-3, *pace* Alport [1972] 148); the Fante federation of city-states under Mankessim (Kea, *supra* 527-9); the two Kotoko federations led by, respectively, Makari and Logone Birni (Hansen, *supra* 531); the federation of *negeri* led by Aceh (Reid, *supra* 426), and the federation of city-states in Lombardy under Milanese hegemony until ca. 1450 (Epstein, *supra* 288).

98. In his *History Of Government* (I: 378-81) Finer (1997) argued that the USA was the first federal state in world history and

that the ancient Greek "leagues" were confederations, not federations. Defining a federal state Finer insists on three characteristics. (1) Duties of government divided between a central government and a number of member-state governments. (2) The two sets of government operate side by side and on equal terms. (3) The central authority must be empowered to act directly on the entire body of citizens through its own agents. It is the third criterion which constitutes the difference between a confederation and a federal state, and, according to Finer, the Boiotian, Aitolian, and Achaian Leagues fulfilled (1) and (2) but not (3). Now in this broad historical perspective it would amount to over-interpretation to maintain a rigid distinction between a confederation and a federal state and project it back into the ancient world. Moreover, there are in fact clear aspects of Finer's third criterion being in operation in some of the ancient Greek "leagues". In The Second Boiotian Federation (379-338 B.C.), for example, the supreme organ of government was an assembly to which citizens from all the *poleis* had direct access, and there is evidence that a federal court could pass a sentence on citizens of individual Boiotian *poleis*. See Larsen [1968]; Walbank [1976-7]; Beck [1997] 18-19; 22-6). – Also the Dutch Republic was not just a confederacy. It was "a cross between federal state and confederacy, with more of the confederacy in form and theory, and more of the federal state in substance and practice" (Israel [1995] 276-7). Thus, Finer's description of the USA as the first federal state in world history is an oversimplification.

99. More (1989) 42-111 = *Utopia* Book 2. The term used to describe each of the fifty-four cities is *civitas*.

100. Elazar (1994) xv: "Nearly 80 per cent of the world's population now live within polities that are either formally federal or that utilize federal arrangements in some way, while only 20 per cent live in polities that can be denominated as outside of any federal arrangements."

101. *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, Chapter 2 Article 3: "The original members of the United Nations shall be the states which ... sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with article 10". Article 4: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter ...". See also *Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly* (New York 1985) Rules 134 and 136. Cf. Cohen (1961) 1127-71.

102. Elazar (1994) xii: "The idea of more than one government exercising powers over the same territory was anathema to the European fathers of the modern nation-state. The twentieth century, on the other hand, is the age of federalism. Hence the existence of more than one government over the same territory, each with its special powers, competence, or tasks, is becoming an increasingly common phenomenon."

103. Chauduri (1991); Kristiansen (1991) 25; Finer (1997) 6.

104. This view can be traced back to Rostovtzeff (1926) 50: "The Roman Empire was to become a commonwealth of self-governing cities. Exception was made only in the case of Egypt, with its immemorial organization, so different and so far removed from the system of Greek city-states. The same principle of policy was applied by Augustus to the West – to Gaul, Spain and Africa."

105. Other possible examples of city-state empires are Ebla in the mid 3rd millennium B.C. (Thuesen, *supra* 60-1), and the city-state kingdoms in China under the Shang and Western Zhou dynasties (Lewis, *supra* 364-5). The present knowledge of Maya

hieroglyphs does not allow us to descide whether the city-state systems ruled by, respectively, Calakmul and Tikal were small city-state empires or federal states (Grube, *supra* 550).

106. Tilly (1994) 13; Bairoch (1988) 197.

107. Sumer: "by 2500 B.C. it looks as though 80% of the population resided in substantial cities of more than 40 ha." (Kuhrt [1995] 31). In classical Hellas at least 1/3 of the population had their homes in walled *poleis* (Hansen, *supra* 155-6). In medieval Germany "although some of the imperial cities created quite substantial territories the majority of the population lived in the urban centre, inside the town walls" (Johanek, *supra* 299). In north Italy in the 14th century ca. 25-30% of the population lived in urban centres (Epstein, *supra* 286); "in 1500 15.8% of all Dutchmen and women lived in cities [of over 10,000 inhabitants]" (Prak, *supra* 343); In Kilwa on the east coast of Africa in 1502 the whole population lived inside the walls (Sinclair & Håkansson, *supra* 471). In the early 1830s the town of Oyo enclosed some 35-40 square km within its walls (Peel, *supra* 512). In cities such as Melaka, Pahang and Patani at least a quarter of the population was urban and largely dependent on imported grain (Reid, *supra* 419). Jaltapec was the capital of a typical Mixtec city-state. In 1547-50 the population of the capital was 4,819 persons out of a total population of 8,308 persons (Lind, *supra* 570). In the Mexican city-state the urban population constituted some 40-75% of the total population (Smith, *supra* 587).

108. The trend is clear but it is impossible to name precise percentages. One reason for the wide range (1/4-3/4) indicated in the text is the disagreement among scholars about the minimum population required to count as a "city" or "town". Following de Vries, Prak (*supra* 343) suggests a population of 10,000 min. Bairoch (1988) 136 "defines as urban any town with a population of five thousand or more," but admits (138) that in a historical context "a limit of 2,000 or even 1,000 would be more appropriate." Among ancient historians the limit is often set as low as 1,000 (Kolb [1984] 15). In medieval Germany many of the 3-4,000 *Städte* – according to the legal definition – could not even muster a population of 1,000 persons (Johanek, *supra* 296). See also Braudel (1967) 371; Wrigley (1991) 107-20.

109. Braudel (1967) 369-74; Hagget (1972) 267-71.

110. Grain: Hansen, *supra* 143; Garnsey (1999) 29-33. Rice: Reid, *supra* 419-20 and (1993) 77. Maize: Lind, *supra* 575. See also Braudel (1967) 78-133, who points out that in the early modern period the Mediterranean long-distance trade in cereals was small when compared with a total population of ca. 60 million persons (94). Yet, we must keep in mind that the urban population constituted a small fraction of the total population, and that the urban centres of city-states constituted a small fraction only of all urban centres.

111. Meyer (1910) 79ff; Beloch (1924) 264-300.

112. See, e.g., Ziebarth (1929); Gomme (1933) and Heichelheim (1964).

113. Hopkins (1983) xi. That Hopkins shares Finley's views is apparent from xxi: "In the first two centuries A.D., total production, consumption and trade were greater than they had been in the previous centuries or were in subsequent centuries. In my view, the Finley model of the ancient economy is sufficiently flexible to incorporate this modest dynamic, without undermining its basic primitivism". For self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) identified with subsistence economy, see Hanson (1995) 78.

114. Most recently in Parkins & Smith (1998); Garnsey (1999). Let

me add that I have always opposed the primitivistic interpretation of the ancient Greek economy, see Isager & Hansen (1975) 50-2.

115. Judiciously pointed out by Davies (1998) 237: "The second contribution of economic anthropology, reinforced by the preoccupations and findings of archaeological survey work, has been to divert attention away from towns and traders towards landscapes and their unurbanised inhabitants."

116. For a critical review of Hicks' theory, including criticism of his historical information, see Bauer (1989).

117. Bernal Diaz del Castillo, quoted from Smith (1996) 114.

118. Importance of trade in city-state cultures: Palestinian (*supra* 69, 73); Assyrian (*supra* 79-82, 85-6); Phoenician (*supra* 90, 96-9); Greek (*supra* 142, 156, 159-60, 164, 169); Arabian (*supra* 241-3, 246-8); Irish (*supra* 251-4); German (*supra* 300-3); Swiss (*supra* 327. 335); Italian (*supra* 278-81, 283, 286, 288); Dutch (*supra* 348-9); Mzâb (*supra* 457-8); Alport [1972] 149); Swahili (*supra* 468-75); Hausa (*supra* 483, 490, 492, 494); Yoruba (*supra* 507, 510-3); Fante (*supra* 519-20, 522-4, 528-9); Niger Delta (*supra* 536, 540-1, 544); Taklamakan (*supra* 395, 398-400, 404); Sriwijaya (*supra* 409-10, 414-5); Malay (*supra* 413, 417-21, 423-7); Maya (*supra* 558); Mixtec (*supra* 573, 575, 578); Aztec (*supra* 588, 590). On the other hand, the Philistine (*supra* 133-4) and the Chinese (*supra* 371-2) city-state cultures were basically agrarian.

Bibliography

Adams, R. McC. 1966. *The Evolution of Urban Society* (London)

Alport, E.A. 1972. "The Mzab," in E. Gellner & Ch. Micaud (eds.), *Arabs and Berbers* (Lexington) 142-52.

Ameling, W. 1993. Karthago (München).

Andrén, A. 1989. "State and Towns in the Middle Ages: The Scandinavian Experience," in Tilly & Blockmans (eds) 128-49.

Arnold, C.J. 1997. *An Archaeology of the Early Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms* (2nd edn. London).

Baines, J. & Yoffee, N. 1998. "Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth in Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia," in Feinman & Marcus (eds.) 199-260.

Bairoch, P. 1988. *Cities and Economic Development from the Dawn of History to the Present* (Chicago).

Barnes, G.L. 1992. *China, Korea and Japan. The Rise of Civilization in East Asia* (London).

Bauer, P.T. 1989. "Economic History As Theory – Review," in J.C. Wood & R.N. Woods (eds.), *Sir John R. Hicks. Critical Assessments* (London) II: 147-62.

Baurain, C. 1997. *Les Grecs et la Méditerranée orientale* (Paris).

Beck, H. 1997. *Polis und Koinon. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Struktur der griechischen Bundesstaaten im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr* (Stuttgart).

Beloch. K.J. 1924. *Griechische Geschichte* I.1 (2nd edn. Strassburg).

Below, G. von. 1898. *Das ältere deutsche Städtewesen und Bürgertum* (Bielefeldt).

Berve, H. 1951. *Griechische Geschichte* (2nd edn. Freiburg).

Bock, G., Skinner, Q. & Viroli, M. (eds.) 1990. *Machiavelli and Republicanism* (Cambridge).

Bowsky, W.M. 1981. *A Medieval Italian Commune. Siena under the Nine, 1287-1355* (Berkeley & Los Angeles).

Braudel, F. 1967. *Civilisation matérielle et capitalisme (XVᵉ – XVIIIᵉ siècle* (Paris).

Burckhardt, J. 1870. *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, vol. 7. in *Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin 1929).

Burckhardt, J. 1898. *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* 1-2 (Berlin).

Burke, P. 1986. "City-States," in Hall (ed.) 137-53.

Cartledge, P. 1996. "Trade," *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3rd edn. Oxford) 1535-7.

Cartledge, P. 1998. "Power and the State," in P. Cartledge (ed.), *Ancient Greece* (Cambridge) 139-65.

Charlton, Th.H. & Nichols, D.L. 1997. "The City-State Concept. Developments and Applications," in Nichols & Charlton (eds.) 1-14.

Chauduri, K.N. 1991. "The Trading City-States and the Territorial Empires: Two Differing Models," in J.D. Tracy (ed.), *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires* (Cambridge).

Childe, V.G. 1950. "The Urban Revolution," *The Town Planning Review* 21: 3-17.

Christaller, W. 1933. *Die zentralen Orte in Süddeutschland: Eine ökonomisch-geographische Untersuchung über die Gesetzmässigkeit der Verbreitung und Entwiklung der Siedlungen mit städtische Funktionen* (Jena).

Chittolini, G. 1991. "The Italian City-State and Its Territory," in Molho, Raaflaub & Emlen (eds.) 589-602.

Clemente, G. 1991. "Concluding Reflections," in Raaflaub & Molho (eds.) 641-8.

Cohen, R. 1961. "The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 109: 1127-71.

Colonna, G. 1986. "Urbanistica e architettura," in Pugliesi Carratelli (ed.) 369-530.

Conze, E. *et alii* 1990. "Staat und Suveränität" in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* 6 (Stuttgart) 1-154.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. 1993. *Histoire des villes d'Afrique noire* (Paris).

Cornell, T.J. 1995. The Beginnings of Rome (London).

Davies, J.K. 1998. "Ancient Economies: Models and Muddles," in Parkins & Smith (eds.) 225-56.

Demandt, N. 1996. "*Poleis* on Cyprus and Oriental Despotism," in M.H. Hansen & K. Raaflaub (eds.), *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*. Papers from the Copenhagen Centre 3 (Stuttgart) 7-15.

Dent, N.J.H. 1992. *A Rousseau Dictionary* (Oxford).

Dike, K.O. 1956. *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885* (Oxford).

Doehring, K. 1987. "State," in *Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (North Holland) 423-8.

Duverger, M. 1966. *Sociologie politique* (3rd edn. Paris).

Easton, D. 1971. *The Political System* (2nd edn. New York).

Fineman, G.M. & Marcus, J. 1998. *Archaic States* (Santa Fe).

Finer, S.E. 1997. *The History of Government* I-III (Oxford).

Finley, M.I. 1963. *The Ancient Greeks* (London).

Finley, M.I. 1965. "Trade and Politics in the Ancient World. Classical Greece," Deuxième conférence internationale d'histoire économique. Aix-en-Provence 1962. I (Paris).

Finley, M.I. 1973. *The Ancient Economy* (London).

Finley, M.I. 1981. "The Ancient City: From Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond," in B.D. Shaw & R.P. Saller (eds.), *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (London) 3-23.

Finley, M.I. 1983. *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge).

Fowler, W.W. 1893. *The Cirt-State of the Greeks and Romans* (London).

Fustel de Coulanges, N.D. 1864. *La cité antique* (Paris).

Gadamer, H.-G. 1972. *Wahrheit und Methode* (3nd edn. Tübingen).

Garnsey, P. 1999. *Food and Society in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge).

Gawantka, W. 1985. *Die sogenannte Polis* (Stuttgart).

Gomme, A.W. 1937. "Traders and Manufacturers in Greece," in *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford) 42-66.

Gschnitzer, F. 1988. "Die Stellung der *Polis* in der politischen Entwicklung des Altertums," *Oriens Antiquus* 27: 287-302.

Gilissen, J. 1954. "Les institutions administratives et judiciaires des villes, vues sous l'angle de l'histoire comparative," in *La ville. Institutions administratives et judiciaires*, Recueils de la societé Jean Bodin 6 (Bruxelles) 5-26.

Griffeth R. & Thomas C.G. (eds.) 1981. *The City State in Five Cultures* (Santa Barbara).

Gunn, G.C. 1996. *Encountering Macau. A Portuguese City-State on the Periphery of China, 1557-1999* (Boulder).

Hagget, P. 1972. *Geography. A Modern Synthesis* (New York).

Hall, J.A. (ed.) 1986. *States in History* (Oxford).

Hall, J.M. 2000. "Sparta, Lakedaimon and the Nature of Perioikic Dependency," in *CPCPapers* 5: 73-89.

Hammond, M. 1972. *The City in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, Mass.).

Hannum, H. 1993. *Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights* (Dordrecht).

Hansen, M.H. 1994a. "*Poleis* and City-States, 600-323 B.C. A Comprehensive Research Programme," in D. Whitehead (ed.), *From Political Architecture to Stephanus Byzantius*. Papers from the Copenhagen Polis Centre 1 (Stuttgart) 9-17.

Hanson, V.D. 1995. *The Other Greeks. The Family Farm and the Roots of Western Civilization* (New York).

Harden, D. 1971. *The Phoenicians* (Harmondsworth).

Hasebroek. J. 1928. *Staat und Handel im alten Griechenland* (Tübingen).

Hasebroek. J. 1931. *Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte bis zur Perserzeit* (Tübingen).

Hegel, F. 1821. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Berlin).

Heichelheim, F.M. 1964. *An Ancient Economic History* II (Leiden).

Heurgon, J. 1957. "L'état étrusque," *Historia* 6: 63-97.

Hicks, J. 1969. *A Theory of Economic History* (Oxford).

Hopkins, K. 1983. "Introduction," in P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins & C.R. Whittaker (eds.), *Trade in the Ancient Economy* (London) ix-xxv.

Hourani, A.H. 1970. "The Islamic City in the Light of Recent Research," in A.H. Hourani & S.M. Stern (eds.), *The Islamic City* (Glasgow) 9-24.

Isager, S. & Hansen, M.H. 1975. *Aspects of Athenian Society* (Odense).

Israel, J.I. 1995. *The Dutch Republic* (Oxford).

Jellinek, G. 1914. *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (3rd edn. Berlin).

Jones, Ph. 1997. *The Italian City-State* (Oxford).

Kelsen, H. 1946. *General Theory of Law and State* (Cambridge Mass.).

Kenoyer, J.M. 1997. "Early City-States in South Asia," in Nichols & Charlton (eds.) 51-70.

Kenoyer, J.M. 1998. *Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilization* (Oxford).

Kiessling, R. 1979. "Herrschaft – Markt – Landbesitz. Aspekte der Zentralität und der Stadt-Land-Beziehungen spätmittelalterlicher Städte an ostschwäbischen Beispielen," in Meynen (ed.) 180-218.

Kolb, F. 1984. *Die Stadt im Altertum* (München).

Kraeling, C.H. & Adams, R.M. (eds.) 1960. *City Invincible* (Chicago).

Kristiansen, K. 1991. "Chiefdoms, States, and Systems of Social Evolution," in T. Earle (ed.), *Chiefdoms: Power, Economy, and Ideology* (Cambridge) 16-43.

Kuhrt, A. 1995. *The Ancient Near East* 1-2 (London).

Kuhrt, A. 1998. "The Old Assyrian Merchants," in Parkins & Smith (eds.) 16-30.

Lapidus, I.M. 1973. "The Evolution of Muslim Urban Society," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15: 21-50.

Larsen, J.A.O. 1967. *Greek Federal States* (Oxford).

Larsen, M.T. 1976. *The Old Assyrian City-Sate and its Colonies* (Copenhagen).

Lehmann, G.A. 1997. "Geschichte der griechischen Welt," in H.G. Nesselrath (ed.), *Einleitung in die griechische Philologie* (Stuttgart & Leipzig) 365-417.

Lewis, D.M. 1994. "Sicily 413-367 B.C." *Cambridge Ancient History* (2nd edn. Cambridge) VI: 120-55

Liverani, M. 1997. "Ancient Near Eastern Cities and Modern Ideologies," in Wilhelm (ed.) 85-107.

MacCormick, N. 1987: "Sovereignty," in V. Bogdanor (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions* (Oxford) 583-4.

Madvig, J.N. 1840. *Blik på Oldtidens Statsforfatninger med Hensyn til Udviklingen af Monarkiet og en omfattende Statsorganisme* (København), translated into German in 1842 as: *Blicke auf die Staatsverfassungen des Altertums, mit Rücksicht auf die Entwicklung der Monarchie und eines umfassenden Staatsorganismus* in *Archiv für Geschichte, Statistik, Kunde der Verwaltung und Landesrechte der Herzogthümer Schleswig, Holstein und Lauenburg* (Kiel).

Maisels, Ch.K. 1990. *The Emergence of Civilization. From Hunting and Gathering to Agriculture, Cities and the State in the Near East* (London).

Maisels, Ch.K. 1993. *The Near East: Archaeology in the Cradle of Civilization* (London).

Marçais, W. 1928. "L'islamisme et la vie urbaine," *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (Paris) 86-100;

Marcus, J. & Fineman, G. (eds.) 1998. *Archaic States* (Santa Fe).

Masqueray, E. 1886. *Formation des cités chez les populations sédentaires de l'Algérie* (Paris).

McDonald, F. 1985. *Novus Ordo Seclorum. The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution* (Lawrence, Kansas).

Meier, Chr. (ed.) 1994. *Die Okzidentale Stadt nach Max Weber*. *Historische Zeitschrift* Beiheft 17.

Meier, Chr. 1995. *Athen. Ein Neubeginn der Weltgechichte* (München).

Meier-Lemgo, K. 1962. *Geschichte der Stadt Lemgo* (Lemgo).

Meyer, E. 1910. "Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Altertums," in *Kleine Schriften* I (Halle) 79-168.

Meynen, E. (ed.) 1979. *Zentralität als Problem der mittelalterlichen Stadtgeschichtsforschung* (Köln & Wien).

Mieroop, M. van de, 1997. *The Ancient Mesopotamian City* (Oxford).

Miller, J. 1984. *Rousseau. Dreamer of Democracy* (New Haven).

Molho, A., Raaflaub, K. & Emlen, J. (eds.) 1991. *City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy* (Stuttgart).

Montesquieu. 1951. *Œuvres Complètes* II, ed. by R. Caillois (Paris).

More, Th. 1989. *Utopia,* ed. by. G.M. Logan & R.M. Adams (Cambridge).

Morris, A.E.J. 1994. *History of Urban Form before the Industrial Revolutions* (3rd edn. Harlow).

Mumford, L. 1961. *The City in History* (Harmondsworth).

Murray, O. 1996. "Polis," in *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3rd edn. Oxford) 1205-6.

Nettl, J.P. 1968. "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Poli-*

tics 20, 559-92, reprinted in J.A. Hall (ed.), *The State. Critical Concepts* I (London 1994) 9-36.

Nichols, D.L. & Charlton, Th.H. (eds.) 1997. *The Archaeology of City-States* (Washington D.C.).

Nicholson, P.P. 1998. "State," in *Routledge Enbcyclopedia of Philosophy* (London) 9: 120-3.

Nurse, D. & Spear, Th. 1985. *The Swahili. Reconstructing the History and Language of an African Society 800-1500* (Philadelphia).

Olsen, O. 1989. "Royal Power in Viking Age Denmark," in *Les Mondes Normands (VIIIe-XIIe s.)*. Actes du IIe congrès international d'archéologie Médiéval (Caen) 27-32.

Oppenheim, 1992. R. Jennings & A. Watts (eds.), *Oppenheim's International Law* I (9th edn. Harlow).

Parkins, H. & Smith, Chr. (eds.) 1998. *Trade, Traders and the Ancient City* (London).

Pierson, C. 1996. *The Modern State* (London).

Pirenne, H. 1927. *Les villes du moyen age* (Paris), here quoted after the *PUF* edn. (Paris 1971).

Polanyi, K. 1960. "On the Comparative Treatment of Economic Institutions in Antiquity with Illustrations from Athens, Mycenae, and Alalakh," in Kraeling & Adams (eds.) 329-50.

Pugliesi Carratelli, G. (ed.) 1986. *Rasenna. Storia e civiltà degli Etruschi* (Milano).

Raphael, D.D. 1975. "State," in *The New Encyclopædia Britannica* (Chicago) 17: 609-15.

Renfrew, C. & Cherry, J.F. (eds.) 1986. *Peer Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change* (Cambridge).

Richard, C.J. 1994. *The Founders and the Classics* (Cambridge Mass.)

Rochère, D. de la 1996. "La souveraineté de l'État et l'Union Européenne," in R. Drago (ed.), *Souveraineté de l'État et interventions internationales* (Paris) 49-56.

Rostovtzeff, M. 1926. *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford).

Rousseau, J.J. 1964. *Œuvres complètes* III ed. by B. Gagnebin *et al.* (Paris).

Schmitt, C. 1958. "Staat als konkreter, an eine geschichtliche Epoche gebundener Begriff," in C. Schmitt, *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954. Materialen zu einer Verfassungslehre* (Berlin) 375-85.

Schneider, A. 1920. *Die sumerische Tempelstadt* (Essen).

Shahîd, I. 1970. "Pre-Islamic Arabia," in *The Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge) 3-29.

Shaw, T., Sinclair, P., Bassey, A. & Okpoko, A. (eds.) 1993. *The Archaeology of Africa* (London).

Shipley, G. 1997. "The Other Lakedaimonians: The Dependent Perioikic *Poleis* of Laconia and Messenia," in M.H. Hansen (ed.), *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community*. Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre (Copenhagen) 4: 189-281.

Shklar, J. 1990. "Montesquieu and the New Republicanism," in Bock, Skinner & Viroli (eds.) 265-79.

Skocpol, T. 1985: "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in P.B. Evans *et al.* (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge) 3-37.

Smith, A. 1986. *The Ethnic Origin of Nations* (Oxford).

Southall, A. 1998. *The City in Time and Space* (Cambridge).

Thomas, C.G. 1981. "The Greek Polis," in Griffeth & Thomas (eds.) 31-69.

Thompson, J.E.S. 1954. *The Rise and Fall of Maya Civilization* (Norman)

Tilly, Ch. & Blockmans, W.P. 1994. *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe A.D. 1000 to 1800* (Boulder).

Tilly, Ch. 1994. "Entanglements of European Cities and States," in Tilly & Blockmans (eds.) 1-27.

Tocqueville, A. de 1992. *Œuvres* II ed. by A. Jardin *et alii* (Paris)

Torelli, M. 1986. "La storia," in Pugliesi Carratelli (ed.) 15-76.

Toynbee, A. 1970. *Cities on the Move* (Oxford).

Trigger, B. 1993. *Early Civilizations: Ancient Egypt in Context* (Cairo).

Tu Cheng-sheng 1999. "The City-State in Ancient China," in *Studies in Chinese and Western Classical Civilizations. Essays in Honour of Prof. Lin Zhi-chun on his 90th Birthday* (Jilin) 425-41.

Ucko, P.R. Tringham, R. & Dimbleby, G.W. (eds.) 1972. *Man, Settlement and Urbanism* (London).

Waitz, G. 1862. *Grundzüge der Politik*.

Walbank, F. 1976-7. "Were there Greek Federal States," *Scripta Classica Israelica* 3: 27-51.

Walter, U. 1998. "Der Begriff des Staates in der griechischen und römischen Geschichte," in Th. Hantos & G.A. Lehmann (eds.), *Althistorisches Kolloquium aus Anlass des 70. Geburtstags von Jochen Bleicken* (Stuttgart) 9-27.

Wang, Z. 1982. *Han Civilization* (New Haven).

Weber, M. 1921/1972. "Die Stadt. Eine Soziologische Untersuchung," *Archiv von Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 47: 621-772, republished as Chapter 8 of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen 5th edn. 1972) 727-814.

Wheatley, P. 1971. *The Pivot of the Four Quarters* (Edinburgh).

Wheatley, P. 1972. "The Concept of Urbanism," in Ecko, Tringham & Dimbleby (eds.) 601-47.

Wilhelm, G. (ed.) 1997. *Die Orientalische Stadt. Kontinuität, Wandel, Bruch* (Saarbrücken).

Wilson, D.J. 1997. "Early State Formation on the North Coast of Peru," in Nichols & Charlton (eds.) 229-44.

Wrigley, E.A. 1991. "City and Country in the Past: a Sharp Divide or a Continuum?" *Historical Research* 64: 107-20.

Ziebarth, E. 1929. *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten Griechenland* (Hamburg).

Zippelius, R. 1989. *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (12th edn. München).